

SUBJECT: Texas House of Representatives redistricting

COMMITTEE: Redistricting — committee substitute recommended

VOTE: 11 ayes — Solomons, Aycock, Branch, Eissler, Geren, Harless, Hunter, Keffer, Madden, Peña, Phillips

5 nays — Villarreal, Alonzo, Alvarado, Hilderbran, Veasey

1 absent — Pickett

WITNESSES: For — Doris Williams; (*Registered, but did not testify*: Fred McGhee)

Against — Ferole Bhandara, Intl. Management Dist. of Houston; Rogene Gee Calvert, Texas Asian American Redistricting Initiative; Sandra Crenshaw; Luis Figueroa, MALDEF; Veronica Gonzales, State Rep. District 41; Brian Hamon, Williamson County Democratic Party; Lupe Martinez; David Nguyen, Vietnamese American Voters League Texas; Thuy Phan, Vietnamese American Community in District 149; Anita Privett, League of Women Voters of Texas; Barbara Quattro; John Truong; Lily Truong; Nicolle Tryals; Fidel Acevedo, LULAC Council 4860 District XII; David Barkemeyer; Timothy Bradberry; Kevin Burns, Wise County; Chris Chapman, City of Irving, Greater Irving – Las Colinas Chamber of Commerce; Jacquie Chaumette, Avalon Residents – Sugarland, TX; José Chavez; Linda Chavez, State LULAC Office; Sandra Crenshaw, Democratic Precinct 3549; Rosemary Edwards, Travis County Republican Party; Jonathan Fong, Texas Asian American Redistricting Initiative, House 80-20 Political Action Committee; Larry Gonzales; Donna Klaegez; George Korbel; Daniel McDonald; Marcelo Tafoya, HOPE; Mini Timmaratu, Texas Asian American Redistricting Initiative; Celeste Villarreal, Mexican-American Bar Association of Texas; Don Zimmerman, State Republican Executive Committeeman, SD-14 (*Registered but did not testify*: Nancy Bui; Rosemary Edwards, Travis County Republican Party; Matthew Garcia, MALDEF; Armando Garza; Loi Lam; Janele McCall; Don Postell, City of Grand Prairie; Loi Thai; Mai Tran; Thanh Tran; Angela Truong; Sarah Winkler; Ajit Dugal; Lori Granados; Tanya Pal; Raj Patel; Russell Phillips; Johnnie B. Rogers, State Republican Executive Committee, SD-24; Linda Rogers, Burnet County

Republican Party; Seema Sa Nghi; Roger Sikes; Shawn Stevens,  
Democratic Party of Collin County)

On — Chuck Bailey, Las Colinas Association; David Hanna, Texas  
Legislative Council; Gabriel Soliz; (*Registered, but did not testify*: Annie  
Ramos)

**BACKGROUND:** The U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 2 requires an “actual enumeration” or census every 10 years to apportion the number of representatives each state will receive in the U.S. House of Representatives. The release of population figures from the census also triggers redistricting – or redrawing of political boundaries – of the state’s legislative and State Board of Education (SBOE) districts as well as congressional districts. Texas Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 28, requires the Legislature to apportion the state into House and Senate districts “at its first regular session after the publication of each United States decennial census.”

**House redistricting deadline.** Under the Texas Constitution, if the Legislature does not enact a valid House or Senate plan during the regular session, the Legislative Redistricting Board (LRB), composed of the lieutenant governor, the House speaker, the attorney general, the comptroller, and the land commissioner, must draw the lines. Upon adoption by the board and after being filed with the secretary of state, the plan becomes law and is to be used in the next general election. The LRB drew both House and Senate districts in 1971, 1981, and 2001. The plan the LRB drew for the House in 2001, as modified by the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, is the plan in use today.

No mechanism similar to the LRB exists for redrawing congressional or SBOE districts should the Legislature fail to adopt a redistricting plan. If the Legislature or the LRB fails to draw new districts following the census, or if the district lines are invalidated for failure to meet one of the many legal requirements, the task falls to a court. Under federal law (42 U.S.C., sec. 2284), a three-judge court hears any actions challenging the apportionment of congressional districts and state legislative bodies.

**Legal requirements for redistricting the Texas House.** The legal standards for House redistricting fall into four general areas:

- state and federal constitutional standards, such as population equality;

- application of federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) requirements for challenging discriminatory plans under sec. 2 and requirements for advance federal approval (“preclearance”) under sec. 5;
- U.S. Supreme Court decisions during the 1990s prohibiting “racial gerrymandering,” beginning with *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); and
- the county-line rule, Tex. Const., Art. 3, sec. 26, which generally prohibits districts from crossing county lines and encourages the creation of districts that either exist entirely within counties, are whole counties, or are groups of whole counties.

Each standard must be considered in conjunction with the other requirements. The interaction can be complex and contradictory, especially in applying VRA protections to avoid diluting minority voting strength and adhering to the *Shaw* standard that race cannot be the predominant factor in redistricting.

**Federal requirements.** The Legislature will have to consider several aspects of federal law, such as permissible deviations in district population equality, VRA requirements, and court decisions on racial and political gerrymandering.

***District population equality.*** A key requirement for redistricting plans is that districts have approximately equal population, or “one person, one vote.” In 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed its long-standing position that apportionment and redistricting were political issues not appropriate for judicial review. In its landmark decision, *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the court held that federal courts could consider challenges to state legislative redistricting plans. In *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 568 (1964), the court established a requirement that the seats in a legislature be apportioned on the basis of population to ensure “substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens.”

***The 10 percent deviation rule.*** Under the most common method for determining population equality in redistricting plans, courts measure the range by which the districts deviate from absolute numerical equality. To determine the size of a plan’s statistically ideal district, the state’s population is divided by the number of districts in the redistricting plan. The resulting number equals the population of the “ideal district.” For example, the ideal House district in Texas, with a headcount population of

25,145,561 in the 2010 census and 150 House districts, would have a population of 167,637.

In *Reynolds v. Sims*, the Supreme Court held that “[m]athematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement” in state legislative redistricting cases. In *White v. Register*, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld a total population deviation between the largest and smallest Texas House districts of 9.9 percent. The court stated that larger deviations would require justification. Within the 10 percent range, lower courts have held, the state may use the population deviation range for any rational purpose, such as making districts compact or not splitting towns or counties into separate districts.

A discriminatory scheme of population deviation might be invalid for other reasons even if the population deviation were less than 10 percent. In 2004, the U.S. District Court for Northern Georgia, in *Larios v. Fox*, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, found that the Georgia House and Senate plans, each with a total population deviation of 9.98 percent, were arbitrary and discriminatory. The plans maximized the number of safe Democratic seats by systematically overpopulating suburban Republican districts and underpopulating Democratic urban and rural districts. The court found the plans lacked “any legitimate, consistently-applied state interests.” The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the lower court position.

In the same year, in *Rodriguez v. Pataki*, 308 F. Supp. 346, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated it would still scrutinize a redistricting plan even though its total population deviation was 9.78 percent. The court ruled that plaintiffs in a redistricting challenge must show that the deviation in the redistricting plan resulted solely from the promotion of an unconstitutional or irrational state policy and that policy was the actual reason for the deviation. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision as well.

It is unclear what impact *Rodriguez* or *Larios* will have on Texas redistricting. *Larios* implies that any challenge to a population deviation can be brought in much the same way that a challenge is brought against population deviations in congressional districts, which must have as nearly equal a population as possible. As such, any population deviation, especially those that consistently favor a particular political, racial, or ethnic group or region, may be subject to scrutiny.

***Federal Voting Rights Act (VRA).*** A new House redistricting plan will be subject to the VRA, which Congress enacted in 1965 to protect the rights of minority voters to participate in the electoral process in southern states. Sec. 5 of the act was broadened to apply to Texas and certain other jurisdictions in 1975. Amendments enacted in 1982 expanded the remedies available to those challenging discriminatory voting practices anywhere in the nation under sec. 2 of the VRA.

Sec. 5 of the VRA (42 U.S.C., sec. 1973c) requires certain states and their political subdivisions with a history of low turnout and discrimination against certain racial and ethnic minorities to submit all proposed policy changes affecting voting and elections to the Voting Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) or to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for “preclearance.” The judicial preclearance process requires a jurisdiction covered by the VRA to file for a declaratory judgment action, with the U.S. Department of Justice serving as the opposing party. The DOJ reports that almost all preclearance requests follow the administrative preclearance route through the DOJ.

Under sec. 5, state and local governments bear the burden of proving that any proposed change in voting or elections is neither intended, nor has the effect, of denying or abridging voting rights on account of race, color, or membership in a language-minority group. No state or local voting or election change may take effect without preclearance. In effect, changes in election practices and procedures in the covered jurisdictions are frozen until preclearance is granted.

***Retgression.*** A proposed plan is retrogressive under the sec. 5 “effect” prong if its net effect would be to reduce minority voters’ “effective exercise of the electoral franchise” (as defined in *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)) when compared to a benchmark plan. Generally, the most recent plan to have received sec. 5 preclearance (or to have been drawn by a federal court) is the last legally enforceable redistricting plan. For CSHB 150, the benchmark plan would be the 2001 map the LRB created and the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas altered.

The effective exercise of the electoral franchise is assessed in redistricting submissions in terms of the opportunity for minority voters to elect candidates of their choice. The presence of racially polarizing voting is an

important factor considered in assessing minority voting strength. DOJ or the D.C. circuit court may object to a proposed redistricting plan if a fairly drawn alternative plan could ameliorate or prevent that retrogression.

In *Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board*, 528 U.S. 320 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that redistricting plans that are not retrogressive in purpose or effect when compared with the jurisdiction's benchmark plan must be precleared even if they violate other provisions of the VRA or of the Constitution. However, plans precleared under sec. 5 still can be challenged under sec. 2 of the VRA or on 14th Amendment grounds, even by the DOJ that granted sec. 5 preclearance. The burden of proof shifts from the jurisdiction creating the plan to those challenging the proposed redistricting.

**Sec. 2 challenges.** Sec. 2 of the VRA offers a legal avenue for those who wish to challenge existing voting practices on the grounds that they are discriminatory. Sec. 2 became a major factor in redistricting in 1982, when Congress amended it to make clear that results, not intent, are the primary test in deciding whether discrimination exists, based on the "totality of the circumstances."

In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding a sec. 2 claim against multimember legislative districts in North Carolina, established a three-part test that plaintiffs must meet when charging invidious vote dilution. The three standards are:

- the protected group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district";
- the group is politically active; and
- the majority votes in a bloc to the extent that the minority's preferred candidate is defeated in most circumstances.

In *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009), the Supreme Court did not rely on citizenship information when determining if a protected group was large enough to constitute a majority in the district. However, both citizenship and voting age population may be factors for voting eligibility under sec. 2 lawsuits designed to protect the rights of voters.

**Maximizing minority-controlled districts.** The U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 507 U.S. 25 (1993), addressed the key sec. 2 issue of proportionality or the ratio of minority-controlled districts

and the minority's share of the state population. The *De Grandy* plaintiffs objected to a Florida redistricting plan because it was possible to draw additional Hispanic majority districts in Dade County. Even though the Supreme Court seemed to accept the contention that *Gingles* standards had been met, it rejected claims that additional majority-minority districts were required to meet sec. 2 claims. According to the court, "Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of Section 2." In other words, the court seemed to reject the contention previously raised in sec. 2 challenges, and adopted by DOJ in sec. 5 preclearance reviews in the early 1990s, that if a majority-minority district can be drawn, then it must be drawn, assuming the *Gingles* criteria are met.

The Supreme Court has held both that sec. 2 can require the creation of a "majority-minority" district, in which a minority group makes up a numerical, working majority of the voting-age population, *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. 146 (1993), and that sec. 2 does not require the creation of an "influence" district, in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected, *LULAC v. Perry*.

In 2009, in *Bartlett v. Strickland*, a case involving redistricting of the General Assembly in North Carolina, which has a constitutional provision similar to the Texas requirement that whole counties not be divided, the Supreme Court rejected as a justification for cutting county lines the creation of a "crossover" district. In a crossover district, a minority group made up less than a voting-age majority in the district but was large enough to elect the preferred candidate of its choice with the help of some majority voters. The court ruled that sec. 2 does not grant special protection to minority groups to form political coalitions.

**Gerrymandering.** The word "gerrymandering" was coined in 1812, when a Massachusetts redistricting plan designed to benefit the party of Gov. Elbridge Gerry resulted in a district that a political cartoonist drew to resemble a salamander. Traditionally, gerrymandering has been considered a technique to maximize the electoral prospects of one party while reducing that of its rivals.

**Racial gerrymandering.** In a series of redistricting challenges during the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with guidelines on how to resolve the tension between race-conscious VRA requirements and the constitutional restraints against race-based actions under the 14th

Amendment. In the original *Shaw v. Reno* opinion, the Supreme Court rejected redistricting legislation with districts alleged to be so bizarrely shaped that on their face they were considered unexplainable on grounds other than race. In *Miller v. Georgia*, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), the court held that those challenging a redistricting plan need not necessarily show that a district was bizarrely shaped in order to establish impermissible race-based gerrymandering.

In *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 900 (1995), a case challenging the Texas congressional redistricting plan, the Supreme Court recognized that the state could consider race as a factor, but found the Texas congressional plan unconstitutional because race was the predominant factor motivating the drawing of district lines and traditional, race-neutral districting principles were subordinated to race.

In the *Shaw* line of cases, courts have identified certain traditional, race-neutral redistricting criteria. These include:

- compactness;
- contiguity;
- preserving counties, voting precincts, and other political subdivisions;
- preserving communities of interest;
- preserving the cores of existing districts;
- protecting incumbents; and
- achieving legitimate partisan objectives.

Under the *Shaw* cases, a redistricting plan will survive a challenge only if it proves that race was not the predominant factor in drawing its challenged minority districts.

***Partisan gerrymandering.*** In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109, established a two-pronged test for invalidating a politically gerrymandered plan under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Challengers must show (a) an actual or projected history of disproportionate results and (b) that the electoral system is arranged so that it consistently degrades a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole to the point where the individual or group "essentially [has] been shut out of the process."



In 2004, the Supreme Court, in *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267, reaffirmed that claims of political gerrymandering still can be made, but the court, either rejecting the argument of political gerrymandering altogether or believing the *Bandemer* standards were unworkable, could not agree on how to evaluate such a claim. In *LULAC v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), in reviewing the Texas Legislature's 2003 congressional redistricting plan, the Supreme Court again considered partisan gerrymandering but rejected it as a claim because the court could not find a workable standard. Challenges to political gerrymandering remain uncertain until the Supreme Court establishes a standard.

**County-line rule.** Tex. Const., Art. 3, sec. 26, generally prohibits crossing county lines when creating House districts and requires the creation of districts that exist either entirely within counties, are whole counties, or are groups of whole counties.

In *Clements v. Valles*, 620 S.W.2d 112 (1981), the Texas Supreme Court decided that if the population of a county is "slightly under or over" the population of an ideal district, then the county must constitute a separate House district by itself. If a county is entitled to less than one district because its population is substantially lower than the ideal district size, it must not be split between two districts. Instead, it should be placed in a district that consists of a cluster of whole counties.

If a county is entitled to one or more than one representative because its population is significantly higher than the ideal population, it should be awarded that number of districts. If the population of a county is large enough to include one or more whole House district and enough population for a fraction of an additional district, the county has "surplus population." In *Craddick v. Smith*, 471 S.W.2d 375 (1971), the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the surplus population may be joined with another adjacent county in another district. Surplus population should be joined with one or more adjacent counties in a single district to minimize the number of county lines crossed. If a county can be divided into a whole number of districts with population deviations permissible under federal law, then *Valles* requires that the county be treated as having no surplus population.

According to the court, preserving the integrity of county lines promotes several state interests, including:

- identifiable county delegations;
- preservation of constituencies within counties;
- minimization of voter confusion;
- facilitating the administration of elections and the conducting campaigns; and
- limiting the opportunity for gerrymandering.

In *Craddick*, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the county-line rule must be enforced to the extent possible without violating federal redistricting law. In 1981, the Supreme Court in *Valles* ruled that challenges to a redistricting plan can be made by showing that the plan divides one or more counties in violation of the county-line rule. The burden then shifts to the state to prove that each county split is necessary to comply with federal law.

**Residency.** Texas Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 7 requires a person to be a resident of a House district at least one year preceding his or her election in order to be eligible to represent it.

DIGEST:

CSHB 150 would adopt PLAN H113 as proposed by the House Redistricting Committee. Exact data on district population and other demographic information on PLAN H113 and other data are available at <http://gis1.tlc.state.tx.us/>. The plan would apply starting with the primary and general elections in 2012 for House seats in 2013.

CSHB 150 would create 150 districts. The ideal size of a House district is 167,637 based on the 2010 census. Under CSHB 150, 167,637 also would be the mean average size of House districts. The overall population range between the largest and smallest districts would 16,753 or 9.99 percent. House District 120 in Bexar County would be the largest district with 175,933. This would be 8,296, or 4.95 percent, above the mean average. House District 119 in Bexar County would be the smallest district with a population of 159,180. This would be 8,457, or 5.04 percent, below the mean average.

The bill states legislative intent that if any county, tract, block group, block, or other geographic area was erroneously omitted, a court reviewing the bill should include the appropriate area in accordance with the Legislature's intent. It also would repeal the House plan created by the LRB in 2001.

The bill would take immediate effect if finally passed by a two-thirds record vote of the membership of each house. Otherwise, it would take effect August 29, 2011.

NOTES:

**Legal challenges to use of 2010 census data in redistricting.** Lawsuits challenging the 2010 census data for use in redistricting already have been filed in Texas. *Teuber v. Texas*, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenges the use of counts of non-citizens in census data that will be used for redistricting. *Mexican American Legislative Caucus (MALC) v. Texas*, filed in the 139th state district court in Hidalgo County, argues that significant parts of the Texas population, specifically minorities in urban and border counties, were under-counted by the 2010 census and that an undercount may result in underrepresentation in any redistricting plan that uses census 2010 data.

## CSHB 150 House District Demographics

### Ideal Population Deviations and Racial / Ethnic Breakdown

	Population	# Deviation from Ideal*	% Deviation from Ideal*	----- Percentage -----				
				Anglo	Black	Hisp	B + H**	Other
DISTRICT 1	165,823	-1,814	-1.08	70.8	20.1	6.9	26.7	2.5
DISTRICT 2	173,869	6,232	3.72	78.2	7.0	12.6	19.4	2.4
DISTRICT 3	164,795	-2,842	-1.70	64.9	9.0	24.1	32.8	2.3
DISTRICT 4	168,429	792	0.47	73.9	9.5	14.8	24.0	2.0
DISTRICT 5	160,253	-7,384	-4.40	70.1	11.4	17.1	28.3	1.7
DISTRICT 6	160,008	-7,629	-4.55	59.4	20.0	18.5	38.1	2.5
DISTRICT 7	161,039	-6,598	-3.94	66.0	18.2	14.1	31.9	2.1
DISTRICT 8	161,098	-6,539	-3.90	64.5	15.8	18.5	33.9	1.6
DISTRICT 9	166,719	-918	-0.55	70.3	19.3	9.1	28.2	1.5
DISTRICT 10	163,063	-4,574	-2.73	67.0	9.2	22.3	31.2	1.8
DISTRICT 11	168,699	1,062	0.63	63.3	17.8	17.5	34.9	1.7
DISTRICT 12	160,573	-7,064	-4.21	55.2	20.4	23.4	43.1	1.7
DISTRICT 13	170,617	2,980	1.78	66.9	12.8	19.5	31.9	1.3
DISTRICT 14	163,187	-4,450	-2.65	56.3	12.7	24.4	36.6	7.1
DISTRICT 15	167,349	-288	-0.17	74.9	4.7	15.2	19.6	5.5
DISTRICT 16	166,807	-830	-0.50	66.9	6.1	25.2	30.9	2.2
DISTRICT 17	168,753	1,116	0.67	53.6	8.8	36.6	44.7	1.7
DISTRICT 18	169,888	2,251	1.34	66.0	16.1	16.4	32.2	1.8
DISTRICT 19	171,969	4,332	2.58	79.2	11.9	7.1	18.9	1.9
DISTRICT 20	162,452	-5,185	-3.09	68.7	5.7	22.3	27.5	3.8
DISTRICT 21	174,622	6,985	4.17	76.5	9.2	11.0	20.0	3.5
DISTRICT 22	159,488	-8,149	-4.86	29.4	49.3	17.8	66.5	4.2
DISTRICT 23	163,720	-3,917	-2.34	51.5	20.1	26.0	45.4	3.1
DISTRICT 24	162,685	-4,952	-2.95	69.6	7.7	18.0	25.3	5.1
DISTRICT 25	174,168	6,531	3.90	54.6	12.1	31.5	43.0	2.3
DISTRICT 26	160,091	-7,546	-4.50	44.3	12.2	16.4	28.2	27.5
DISTRICT 27	160,084	-7,553	-4.51	21.0	43.8	21.7	64.6	14.4
DISTRICT 28	160,373	-7,264	-4.33	46.6	15.0	22.0	36.4	17.0
DISTRICT 29	175,700	8,063	4.81	50.6	13.5	26.1	39.1	10.3
DISTRICT 30	160,749	-6,888	-4.11	50.6	5.9	41.7	47.1	2.3
DISTRICT 31	168,636	999	0.60	4.3	0.6	95.1	95.5	0.2
DISTRICT 32	170,336	2,699	1.61	44.1	4.4	47.9	51.7	4.2
DISTRICT 33	172,135	4,498	2.68	70.0	7.6	15.5	22.7	7.3
DISTRICT 34	169,887	2,250	1.34	21.7	4.6	73.4	77.3	1.0
DISTRICT 35	172,482	4,845	2.89	37.1	3.1	58.9	61.6	1.4
DISTRICT 36	173,981	6,344	3.78	5.6	0.5	93.5	93.7	0.8
DISTRICT 37	169,364	1,727	1.03	9.6	0.6	89.3	89.6	0.8
DISTRICT 38	167,793	156	0.09	8.9	0.7	89.8	90.1	1.0

*Source: Texas Legislative Council*

\*Ideal District Population is 167,637

\*\*Total number of persons who identify as racially black, ethnically Hispanic, or both.

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CSHB 150 House District Demographics (continued)

	Population	# Deviation from Ideal*	% Deviation from Ideal*	----- Percentage -----				
				Anglo	Black	Hisp	B + H**	Other
DISTRICT 39	175,383	7,746	4.62	8.0	0.5	91.4	91.5	0.5
DISTRICT 40	159,381	-8,256	-4.92	16.3	1.1	79.9	80.6	3.2
DISTRICT 41	172,374	4,737	2.83	4.1	0.8	94.7	95.0	0.9
DISTRICT 42	160,647	-6,990	-4.17	3.4	0.5	95.7	95.9	0.8
DISTRICT 43	171,735	4,098	2.44	17.9	1.7	79.7	80.9	1.3
DISTRICT 44	174,451	6,814	4.06	55.8	6.1	36.3	41.8	2.5
DISTRICT 45	167,604	-33	-0.02	59.9	4.0	34.2	37.6	2.5
DISTRICT 46	172,417	4,780	2.85	25.7	22.3	48.5	69.5	4.8
DISTRICT 47	175,314	7,677	4.58	75.3	2.2	14.3	16.2	8.4
DISTRICT 48	173,008	5,371	3.20	66.5	4.1	22.8	26.5	7.0
DISTRICT 49	167,309	-328	-0.20	61.5	5.3	24.9	29.7	8.8
DISTRICT 50	171,227	3,590	2.14	47.3	13.1	28.9	41.1	11.6
DISTRICT 51	164,991	-2,646	-1.58	25.7	9.5	62.8	71.2	3.1
DISTRICT 52	160,675	-6,962	-4.15	59.8	7.9	24.6	31.8	8.4
DISTRICT 53	160,655	-6,982	-4.16	65.9	1.8	31.0	32.5	1.7
DISTRICT 54	167,736	99	0.06	47.6	27.8	20.1	45.9	6.6
DISTRICT 55	162,176	-5,461	-3.26	56.9	17.6	22.6	39.1	4.0
DISTRICT 56	163,869	-3,768	-2.25	65.1	11.5	21.2	32.1	2.8
DISTRICT 57	164,418	-3,219	-1.92	66.2	16.7	15.9	32.3	1.5
DISTRICT 58	169,146	1,509	0.90	77.0	3.0	17.9	20.7	2.3
DISTRICT 59	163,609	-4,028	-2.40	69.8	9.2	18.6	27.1	3.2
DISTRICT 60	160,599	-7,038	-4.20	75.0	3.9	19.8	23.5	1.5
DISTRICT 61	168,109	472	0.28	85.8	1.6	10.5	12.0	2.2
DISTRICT 62	160,023	-7,614	-4.54	79.3	6.9	10.7	17.4	3.3
DISTRICT 63	167,337	-300	-0.18	71.9	5.5	15.1	20.3	7.8
DISTRICT 64	167,588	-49	-0.03	66.5	9.1	19.6	28.3	5.2
DISTRICT 65	165,742	-1,895	-1.13	51.9	13.6	21.4	34.5	13.6
DISTRICT 66	172,129	4,492	2.68	59.8	9.5	10.0	19.1	21.1
DISTRICT 67	172,141	4,504	2.69	59.3	8.4	15.8	23.8	16.9
DISTRICT 68	164,954	-2,683	-1.60	57.7	4.5	36.8	40.9	1.4
DISTRICT 69	171,025	3,388	2.02	73.4	9.0	14.6	23.1	3.5
DISTRICT 70	172,135	4,498	2.68	67.4	9.9	18.0	27.5	5.1
DISTRICT 71	167,617	-20	-0.01	65.6	7.9	24.7	31.8	2.6
DISTRICT 72	161,974	-5,663	-3.38	56.4	5.5	36.6	41.5	2.1
DISTRICT 73	166,719	-918	-0.55	73.5	1.5	23.3	24.5	1.9
DISTRICT 74	170,005	2,368	1.41	18.4	1.8	78.9	80.3	1.3
DISTRICT 75	159,691	-7,946	-4.74	5.1	1.5	92.9	94.0	1.0
DISTRICT 76	159,760	-7,877	-4.70	8.5	2.4	88.7	90.5	1.0

*Source: Texas Legislative Council*

\*Ideal District Population is 167,637

\*\*Total number of persons who identify as racially black, ethnically Hispanic, or both.

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CSHB 150 House District Demographics (continued)

	Population	# Deviation from Ideal*	% Deviation from Ideal*	----- Percentage -----				
				Anglo	Black	Hisp	B + H**	Other
DISTRICT 77	159,949	-7,688	-4.59	13.7	5.0	80.4	84.3	2.0
DISTRICT 78	160,589	-7,048	-4.20	25.7	5.3	66.7	71.0	3.3
DISTRICT 79	160,658	-6,979	-4.16	12.6	4.2	82.4	85.8	1.6
DISTRICT 80	160,252	-7,385	-4.41	9.7	1.1	88.7	89.3	0.9
DISTRICT 81	169,766	2,129	1.27	42.1	4.7	52.1	56.2	1.8
DISTRICT 82	173,030	5,393	3.22	52.8	6.6	39.0	45.1	2.1
DISTRICT 83	170,069	2,432	1.45	58.3	4.6	35.5	39.7	2.0
DISTRICT 84	167,970	333	0.20	51.3	10.8	35.0	45.0	3.7
DISTRICT 85	160,182	-7,455	-4.45	38.1	15.1	38.8	53.2	8.7
DISTRICT 86	165,183	-2,454	-1.46	68.9	2.8	26.3	28.8	2.3
DISTRICT 87	174,343	6,706	4.00	52.4	8.5	34.6	42.5	5.1
DISTRICT 88	160,664	-6,973	-4.16	74.3	2.7	21.4	23.9	1.8
DISTRICT 89	172,138	4,501	2.68	63.9	9.8	15.0	24.5	11.6
DISTRICT 90	165,444	-2,193	-1.31	20.4	10.9	67.1	77.4	2.2
DISTRICT 91	163,104	-4,533	-2.70	65.6	5.8	21.6	27.0	7.4
DISTRICT 92	162,326	-5,311	-3.17	61.4	12.7	17.0	29.2	9.4
DISTRICT 93	163,232	-4,405	-2.63	53.2	12.8	26.9	39.1	7.7
DISTRICT 94	167,374	-263	-0.16	60.1	14.3	18.2	32.0	7.9
DISTRICT 95	164,247	-3,390	-2.02	17.3	45.8	35.0	79.9	2.7
DISTRICT 96	164,878	-2,759	-1.65	57.9	20.0	17.4	36.8	5.3
DISTRICT 97	161,894	-5,743	-3.43	62.6	14.3	19.4	33.2	4.3
DISTRICT 98	164,081	-3,556	-2.12	78.4	3.8	11.2	14.8	6.7
DISTRICT 99	167,790	153	0.09	67.7	5.3	23.4	28.3	4.0
DISTRICT 100	161,143	-6,494	-3.87	20.4	40.0	38.5	77.8	1.9
DISTRICT 101	164,664	-2,973	-1.77	25.4	28.2	36.2	63.5	11.1
DISTRICT 102	161,136	-6,501	-3.88	46.4	15.0	28.7	43.1	10.5
DISTRICT 103	175,326	7,689	4.59	16.3	7.9	73.6	80.8	2.9
DISTRICT 104	172,784	5,147	3.07	11.9	13.0	73.5	85.7	2.4
DISTRICT 105	175,728	8,091	4.83	34.8	12.7	45.3	57.3	7.9
DISTRICT 106	161,947	-5,690	-3.39	67.3	9.0	16.8	25.5	7.2
DISTRICT 107	171,872	4,235	2.53	45.5	16.7	34.1	50.2	4.3
DISTRICT 108	163,923	-3,714	-2.22	65.7	6.8	22.6	29.1	5.3
DISTRICT 109	174,176	6,539	3.90	17.7	58.6	23.2	80.9	1.5
DISTRICT 110	167,547	-90	-0.05	9.1	40.2	50.7	90.2	0.8
DISTRICT 111	166,979	-658	-0.39	17.8	50.4	29.8	79.3	2.9
DISTRICT 112	167,051	-586	-0.35	42.5	15.5	30.6	45.5	12.0
DISTRICT 113	171,410	3,773	2.25	43.1	19.5	30.5	49.4	7.4
DISTRICT 114	172,330	4,693	2.80	50.2	16.7	28.3	44.6	5.2

*Source: Texas Legislative Council*

\*Ideal District Population is 167,637

\*\*Total number of persons who identify as racially black, ethnically Hispanic, or both.

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CSHB 150 House District Demographics (continued)

	Population	# Deviation from Ideal*	% Deviation from Ideal*	----- Percentage -----				
				Anglo	Black	Hisp	B + H**	Other
DISTRICT 115	166,734	-903	-0.54	44.2	11.7	23.6	34.8	21.0
DISTRICT 116	171,463	3,826	2.28	24.7	6.5	63.7	69.2	6.1
DISTRICT 117	171,249	3,612	2.15	26.0	6.1	66.1	71.2	2.8
DISTRICT 118	161,851	-5,786	-3.45	25.3	4.6	68.7	72.6	2.1
DISTRICT 119	159,180	-8,457	-5.04	22.9	10.0	66.4	75.2	1.9
DISTRICT 120	175,933	8,296	4.95	23.9	27.8	46.9	72.6	3.5
DISTRICT 121	174,867	7,230	4.31	55.1	6.8	34.6	40.6	4.3
DISTRICT 122	175,184	7,547	4.50	59.7	4.1	30.2	33.8	6.5
DISTRICT 123	175,674	8,037	4.79	23.6	4.6	70.6	74.4	2.0
DISTRICT 124	174,823	7,186	4.29	19.9	8.6	69.6	77.0	3.1
DISTRICT 125	174,549	6,912	4.12	20.4	5.2	72.3	76.6	3.0
DISTRICT 126	170,749	3,112	1.86	43.1	15.5	30.5	45.3	11.6
DISTRICT 127	163,724	-3,913	-2.33	63.5	13.1	19.6	32.2	4.4
DISTRICT 128	172,869	5,232	3.12	52.0	12.6	33.7	45.7	2.3
DISTRICT 129	171,751	4,114	2.45	53.8	10.1	24.7	34.3	11.9
DISTRICT 130	175,532	7,895	4.71	64.7	8.4	20.1	28.1	7.2
DISTRICT 131	173,797	6,160	3.67	6.7	43.4	44.3	86.6	6.8
DISTRICT 132	172,973	5,336	3.18	42.6	14.5	36.2	49.9	7.5
DISTRICT 133	173,041	5,404	3.22	42.6	19.5	22.3	41.0	16.4
DISTRICT 134	171,703	4,066	2.43	68.7	5.2	14.1	19.1	12.2
DISTRICT 135	172,422	4,785	2.85	40.8	16.2	31.9	47.2	11.9
DISTRICT 136	172,943	5,306	3.17	47.1	17.0	26.1	42.2	10.7
DISTRICT 137	172,840	5,203	3.10	8.7	17.5	59.1	75.5	15.9
DISTRICT 138	173,044	5,407	3.23	34.8	9.7	46.1	54.9	10.3
DISTRICT 139	175,590	7,953	4.74	12.9	47.5	35.9	82.3	4.8
DISTRICT 140	172,794	5,157	3.08	8.4	11.4	79.0	89.6	1.9
DISTRICT 141	161,971	-5,666	-3.38	10.7	46.3	41.5	86.9	2.4
DISTRICT 142	162,242	-5,395	-3.22	12.6	43.3	43.1	85.4	2.0
DISTRICT 143	172,147	4,510	2.69	17.0	5.7	76.7	81.8	1.3
DISTRICT 144	161,878	-5,759	-3.44	36.7	5.7	54.6	59.7	3.6
DISTRICT 145	168,480	843	0.50	10.4	5.5	82.2	86.9	2.7
DISTRICT 146	174,240	6,603	3.94	16.9	44.0	31.0	73.9	9.2
DISTRICT 147	166,162	-1,475	-0.88	19.6	39.3	36.4	74.8	5.6
DISTRICT 148	173,422	5,785	3.45	20.7	9.7	67.5	76.3	3.0
DISTRICT 149	167,059	-578	-0.34	66.2	7.1	22.0	28.6	5.3
DISTRICT 150	166,145	-1,492	-0.89	56.1	13.8	23.8	37.0	6.9

*Source: Texas Legislative Council*

\*Ideal District Population is 167,637

\*\*Total number of persons who identify as racially black, ethnically Hispanic, or both.