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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

EDGEWOOD I.S.D., et al., Plaintiffs,
ALVARADO I.S.D., et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
GUADALUPE GUTIERREZ, et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
CARROLLTON-FARMERS BRANCH I.S.D., et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
COPPELL I.S.D., et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
STERLING CITY I.S.D., et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
STAFFORD MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DIST., et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
HUMBLE I.S.D., et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,
SOMERSET I.S.D., et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors,

VS.

LIONEL R. MENO, et al., Defendants, and
BEXAR CED, et al., Defendant-Intervenors.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

Respectfully Submitted,

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Efficient: causing effects; producing results; actively operative; not inactive, slack or incapable; characterized by energetic and useful activity...Edgewood I.S.D. vs. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989), quoting, N. Webster, an American Dictionary of the English Language 430 (1864).

I. INTRODUCTION

This brief will show (1) the previous Edgewood decisions demand an efficient system of education; (2) the inadequate legislative response to past decisions; (3) the elements of an efficient system; (4) how current legislation is inadequate to produce an efficient system, and (5) suggest judicial guidelines for evaluating efficiency.

II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

On October 2, 1989 the Texas Supreme Court issued what became the first of a trilogy of opinions examining the method of finance of Texas public schools. Together with a critique of the legislature's effort to remedy the inequities within the boundaries of the constitution's mandate for efficient schools and the general diffusion of knowledge, the Court is again faced with the task of providing guidance to the legislative branch on these questions.

The purpose of this brief is to highlight the fundamental question of the constitutionally required system of public free schools which meet the efficiency standard outlined in the previous Edgewood decisions. The failure of the current educational

delivery system to be "efficient" in the "general diffusion of knowledge" stems from the inability of the legislature to take the necessary steps in reaching this goal in the spirit of the original framers of the Constitution. The results of recent legislative sessions have dealt solely with the input of dollars and not with the output of results which are key to any evaluation of the system in terms of complying with previous Edgewood decisions.

During the constitutional debate of 1876, much of the school debate centered upon taxation. However, another central issue was the deadlock between proponents of "public schools" and advocates of "free schools". A critical philosophical debate in that era centered on one basic question: will education "be best produced by monopoly or by competition?"¹ This debate over the structure of the delivery system is critical to a historical perspective of our constitution. "Public school" proponents felt that a style resembling that of the northern U.S., with a publicly controlled and operated delivery system would be more efficient.² This faction was unable to prevail. "Free school" proponents³ argued in favor of a laissez-faire, local, and parent-driven system. This faction was also unable to prevail. The compromise was finally achieved by adding the word "efficient", apparently due to the fact

¹Eclectic Review, (July-December 1847)

²Public School proponents theorized that economies of scale would yield greater efficiency.

³Also known as Voluntaryists or Free-Traders

that each side thought their preferred delivery system was more efficient.⁴

This mix of state-controlled and community-based education has been transformed immensely since the debates of 1876. Political constituencies and politicians have worked to dramatically increase the state's role and have created a centralized bureaucratic framework that has become difficult to manage, dismantle, and control. As bureaucratic influence has increased, efficiency in the form of outputs of educational achievement has markedly decreased.

III. PREVIOUS EDGEWOOD DECISIONS DEMAND AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM

In Edgewood I, the Court concluded that:

"[I]n mandating "efficiency", the constitutional framers and ratifiers did not intend a system with such vast disparities as now exist. Instead, they stated clearly that the purpose of an efficient system was to provide for a "general diffusion of knowledge." The present system, by contrast, provides not for a diffusion that is general, but for one that is limited and unbalanced. The resultant inequalities are thus directly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency."

Edgewood I.S.D. vs. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989).

The Court clearly indicates the issue of efficiency is tied to measurement of what constitutes the "general diffusion of knowledge". Specifically, the Court recognizes (1) the Legislatures's unwillingness to cope with the changes necessary to

⁴Allan Parker, "Public Free Schools: A Constitutional Right to Educational Choice in Texas", Southwestern L. J. , Vol. 45, No. 2. p. 825.

revamp the current system; (2) pouring of more money into a system vulnerable to bureaucratic expansion; and (3) the danger of levying of more burdensome regulation. The Court in Edgewood I stated:

The legislature's recent efforts have focused primarily on increasing the state's contributions. More money allocated under the present system would reduce some of the existing disparities between districts but would at best only postpone the reform that is necessary to make the system efficient. A band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be changed. Edgewood I, 777 S.W. 2d at 397. (emphasis added)

This Court called on the legislature to revamp the structure of education in Texas and focus on results as a criteria for the efficiency provision. The legislative response to Edgewood I simply manipulated the method of distribution, but did not respond to the Court's call for a structural change in the education delivery system. Efficiency is generally defined as "Acting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or unnecessary effort."⁵ In Edgewood I this court said; "Efficient conveys the meaning of effective or productive of results and connotes the use of resources so as to produce results with little waste...." [Edgewood I, 777 S.W. 2d at 395 (emphasis added)] An important efficient use of resources is measured in higher test scores and academic measurement. Senate Bill 1, the response to Edgewood I, was found by the Court to leave "essentially intact the same funding system with the same deficiencies" that were reviewed in Edgewood I. Edgewood I.S.D. vs. Kirby, 804 S.W. 2d 491, 495 (Tex. 1991). This bill maintained the two-tiered finance structure

⁵The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (Houghlin Mifflin Company) (1976)p. 416.

(The Foundation School Program), along with other manipulations in the funding system. This Court stated:

The fundamental flaw of Senate Bill 1 lies not in any particular provisions but in its overall failure to restructure the system. Edgewood II, 804 S.W. 2d at 496. (emphasis added)

Thus, the inability of the Legislature to restructure the education system in line with constitutional requirements brought this Court into the arena of providing guidance to the Texas Legislature. The Court did not specifically prescribe any one path to the destination of what constitutes an efficient system, but, it did point out some avenues to achieve some equity in resources and use of tax funds. Edgewood II, 804 S.W. 2d at 497-498.

The legislature's response to Edgewood II was SB 351, as amended by HB 2885. Acts of April 11, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S. ch. 20, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 351, amended by Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S. ch. 391, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475. Senate Bill 351 created County Education Districts for the purpose of collecting property taxes. This Senate Bill was found unconstitutional in Carrollton Farmers-Branch I.S.D. vs. Edgewood I.S.D., 826 S.W. 2d 489 (Tex. 1991), because it levied what amounted to a state ad valorem tax without an election in violation of art. VII, sec. 3. SB 351 did not alter the basic structure of public schools, but only affected the distribution of wealth within the current delivery system.

The most recent legislative attempt to remedy the quagmire over public education in Texas is Senate Bill 7. Again, the law

manipulates the method of taxation without focusing on measurable results for Texas school children.

Efficiency must focus on education results. Efficiency, or "producing results" is technically measured by a production function.⁶ The evaluation of education must focus on educational opportunity and measurable indicators of educational achievement (results). "General diffusion of knowledge" is essential to any efficiency evaluation. In our competitive job market, intellectual skills are the key to productivity which raise personal and social standards of living. To the majority of Texas school children (who remain in Texas after graduation), the maintenance and growth of the Texas economy is vital to sustained prosperity. Workplace opportunity and intellectual strength are the building blocks of our democracy and assures future generations of political and economic stability and the availability of resources for a quality education system.

IV. RECENT LEGISLATION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF PREVIOUS EDGEWOOD DECISIONS

"Money is not the only issue . . . We are constrained by the arguments raised by the parties to address only issues of school finance. We have not been called upon to consider, for example, the improvements in education which could be realized by eliminating gross waste in the bureaucratic administration of the system." Edgewood III, (Justice Cornyn's concurring and dissenting opinion).

⁶A production function is a description of the amounts of output expected from various combinations of inputs. See, Amacher & Ulbrich, Principles of Economics, (Fifth Edition). at 577-580

A. THE GROWTH IN BUREAUCRACY MAKES THE SYSTEM INEFFICIENT

Prior to Edgewood I, there have been many attempts to expand the educational bureaucracy but few attempts to limit it. Most notable, since the Gilmer-Aiken Bill established the Texas Education Agency in 1949 the number of bureaucrats as compared to the number of students has expanded to the point where nearly half of the employees in school districts are non-teachers.⁷

"The only force powerful enough to counter the inherent tendency of organizations to add administrative overhead is the pressure of competition."⁸ Despite the Edgewood litigation, the vast growth of teachers, administration, and support staff, outpaced the growth of pupil enrollment in Texas public schools. In the 1980's, student enrollment increased 16%, but other areas of growth are: teachers, 27%; administrators, 45%; and support staff, 57%. These figures not only represent a growth in bureaucracy, but a grossly disparate growth compared to the number of students seeking the services of such personnel. For example, for every five new students added to the Texas public schools, one new school employee was added.⁹ Because of this burgeoning growth of non-

⁷U.S. Department of Education, "The Condition of Education, 1989: Elementary and Secondary Education," Vol. 1, p.79. It has been pointed out that part of the reason for American educational deterioration is that much of this money never reaches the classroom. See, Thomas Sowell, Inside American Education.

⁸ Rothschild, Bionomics Economy as Ecosystem at 310

⁹Texas Research League, "Bench Marks 1992-93 School District Budgets in Texas," July 1993, p. 1.

teachers, in the 1992-93 school year only 57.9 percent of operating expenses in Texas were spent on instructional costs.¹⁰

The growth of the bureaucracy feeds upon itself. More administrators adopting more rules that require more administrators to implement the rules and burden teachers with additional bureaucratic mandates.¹¹ The bureaucracy has created many beneficiaries who have a vested interest in maintaining the existing system. Over 150 special interest groups lobbied the legislature for increased education spending during recent sessions, including teacher unions, administrators' organizations, and local groups.¹² In most counties in Texas, the public schools are the major employer.¹³ Thus, the self interest of various groups for employment and membership roles is evident, the local economies of many counties are growing ever more dependant on the infusion of state monies to maintain the local economy by the purchases of local goods and spending by school employees. The interests of educational results for the children are not being served well.

Therefore, despite the easy calculation of bureaucrats in relation to students, the negative effects of the current system

¹⁰id. at 11.

¹¹ "A bureaucracy lacks the capacity to do anything but grow and reproduce itself." Rothschild, Bionomics-Economy as Ecosystem. at 310

¹²Texas Public Policy Foundation: Education Task Force Report, "Choice in Education: Opportunities in Texas", March 1990.

¹³Texas Agenda, Vol.1, No. 14, Nov. 16, 1989.

with respect to efficiency are becoming clear as the system creates incentives to focus on dollars spent, not on results achieved. Because of the large number of beneficiaries who look to dollars input elected officials can gain by supporting policies that favor special interest groups at the expense of the general public and the poorly served students.¹⁴

In the 1800's Free-Traders argued that a market driven system would be much more efficient, as a leading scholar indicated; "we may be quite sure that a state education would be administered for the advantage of those in power rather than for the advantage of the nation."¹⁵ Today, the influence of these special interests are a serious roadblock to constitutionally "efficient" legislation. These interests have significant political clout and generally prefer to maintain centralized decisions. Educational decisions and control of resources centered in Austin allow these interests more power and influence. Centralized decisions produce results contrary to the constitutional goal of "efficiency".

The Texas Education Agency has substantially increased the volume of regulations contained in the Texas Administrative Code. These regulations touch nearly every aspect of school operations. Central decision-making is extended by the requirements of each local district to show how they comply with the ever-increasing number of directives from Austin. Additionally, TEA prescribes much of the content taught and influences the methods by which

¹⁴See, Gwartney and Stroup, Economics and Prosperity.

¹⁵ Spencer, Social Statics

teachers can teach. Many dedicated and competent teachers are restrained by bureaucracy from utilizing more creative approaches to education. Indeed, many teachers believe they are now in an occupation which resembles that of an assembly line worker. This loss of autonomy at the delivery level has resulted in widespread dissatisfaction by many teachers.

One of the most disturbing trends is the performance of inner-city campuses in large school districts. In Houston I.S. D. and Dallas I.S.D. combined, 254 campuses had at least one in five students failing all TAAS tests.¹⁶ Traditional excuses (race, poverty, working mothers etc.) do not account for these failures.¹⁷ Although many private schools are doing a fine job with these same students, our public system is unable to adjust to the needs of students in these large districts. What may be best in a rural Texas county with many Spanish-speaking migrant children may have little to do with what may work best in large Houston schools, yet Austin controls school operations. *An efficient system would not produce such poor performance, nor allow such disparities in results.* This in part is a result of diseconomies of scale.¹⁸

¹⁶Texas Education Agency test results. See Appendix C

¹⁷Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, See also, Chubb and Moe, School Reform in Great Britain (Bureaucratic, ineffective schools are simply normal for a system of top-down control.).

¹⁸"Diseconomies of scale result from the fact that as an organization becomes very large, communication and coordination become more difficult and time consuming, and control from the top diminishes. After a firm has taken advantage of the gains to be achieved by growing larger, managerial inefficiencies set in." Amacher & Ulbrich, Principles of Economics.

"Academic success is a product of effective school organization. . . . Autonomy has the strongest influence on the overall quality of school organization of any factor that we examined. . . . In the public sector, where schools are controlled by politics, autonomy is generally low. . . . [I]nstitutions of democratic control work systematically and powerfully to discourage autonomy and in turn, school effectiveness."¹⁹

Public monopolies have little reason or ability to be efficient. Inefficient providers are not forced out of business. Contrary to a market-oriented system where inefficient providers are forced to either increase efficiency or exit the market, no removal of inefficient providers occurs. Monopolistic power protected by state legislation protects and keeps in place inefficient providers of public education. A recent poll of Texas economists found that 87% consider a system which allows for new entry of new providers and failure of poor providers to be more efficient. Rather than reallocating resources to achieve greater efficiency and productivity, public entities lobby to raise taxes to cover the results of these inefficiencies.²⁰ Public schools, like any other supplier not subject to some form of market forces, are monopolies that have a history of allocating resources in an ineffective manner.²¹

¹⁹Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools.

²⁰ See, Gwartney and Stroup, Economics and Prosperity

²¹"Monopolies are less efficient in allocating resources to match consumer preferences. Amacher & Ulbrich, Principles of Economics.

A recent study found that on average Texas public school districts are at least 7.4% inefficient.²² Because the analysis compares efficiency relative to the "best practice" among public school districts and does not consider whether or not private schools could be more efficient than the most efficient public schools, the estimate should be considered a lower estimate on public school inefficiency.²³

The Chubb and Moe study included both public and private schools, and found that an effectively organized high school could account for one full year difference in academic achievement. This is equivalent to a 25% difference in productivity.

B. THE CURRENT SYSTEM IS INHERENTLY INEFFICIENT

All public monopolies have certain characteristics; public education is no exception. As a sole provider that can force tax contributions, public monopolies fail to provide sovereignty for consumers. In a competitive market, consumers drive decisions since providers must satisfy consumer needs to stay in business. Eighty-three percent of Texas economist consider allowing consumers a choice of providers to be more efficient.²⁴ Monopolies are inherently inefficient since they cater to political interests rather than consumer needs. Political decisions allow the monopoly to survive and prosper. Producer sovereignty then replaces

²² Federal Reserve Working Paper, Number 9408 (Appendix A)

²³ Lori Taylor, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Dallas

²⁴ See Appendix B

consumer sovereignty. Providers must please politicians, not consumers.

Under SB 7, the major inefficient aspects of the pre-Edgewood system are left intact. The legislature tackled the efficiency issue only by focusing on the input of money. This is counter to the Edgewood mandates. In Edgewood I, the Court emphasized the need for results. Therefore, the standard set forth in Edgewood I focuses on the concept of educational achievement as a measure for the efficiency of the public school system. In addition, Edgewood I states:

"An efficient system does not preclude the abilities of communities to exercise local control over the education of their children. ...An efficient system will actually allow for more local control, not less". (emphasis added)

Edgewood I, 777 S.W. 2d at 398. What has occurred does not resemble the characteristics of the Court's observations. The minimally efficient system of which Edgewood I speaks cannot and will not occur under the present framework of SB 7.

The current educational delivery system can never be efficient as a centralized monopolistic provider of education. The Constitution of Texas expressly recognizes the anti-competitive nature of publicly-maintained monopolies.²⁵ That applies to the monopoly position enjoyed by the public education establishment. The main flaw in this monopoly is the mandating of details of operation, instead of allowing school districts to create programs

²⁵ "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government and shall never be allowed," TEX. CONST. art. I, sec. 26.

they believe will best serve their students. No incentive is provided to conserve resources or use existing resources effectively to minimize waste. A typical example of the lack of incentive to work to make efficient use of resources comes from a news report about how the Mansfield school district asserts it will cope with a deficit in its 1994-95 budget. An official stated "that the outlook will probably not improve in the next few years, and that the district should consider privatization of bus and food service . . . among many other things."²⁶ Only when faced with a budget "crisis" do school administrators begin to think about efficiency moves. The entire world has been learning about the benefits of privatization, but Texas school districts create their own budget problems by refusing to consider efficiency measures until they become desperate.

One of the states's top officials, a defendant in this suit, Comptroller John Sharp, recently contrasted two federal programs as examples of efficient vs. inefficient delivery systems. One example, the G.I. Bill, delivered higher education services to veterans in a very effective manner because it was merely funded by government, providing students the right to select their educational provider. The details of the education they received were not run by government.

Conversely, the Veteran's Administration hospital system is a government funded and operated delivery system of health care.

²⁶ "Mansfield schools project \$800,000 debt, despite cuts," *Fort-Worth Star Telegram*, May 13, 1994, at 23A.

This system is widely criticized as inefficient due to its poor allocation of resources and inadequate delivery of health services at high cost.²⁷

Additional examples of how centralized production decisions lower quality of service, while extracting high revenues, are common. After deregulation of the airlines in the late 1970's, a number of new air carriers entered the delivery system of air transportation (for the first time since 1949), and inefficient carriers no longer protected by higher air fares were allowed to fail. An efficient system demands that new providers be allowed to enter the market and inefficient providers be allowed to exit the market. In today's competitive market, air fares are down, more people fly than ever before, schedules are adhered to more closely, less baggage is lost in transit, and the service is rated overall quite favorably by most consumer polls. The system is more efficient than when controlled centrally.

On a global scale, monopolies have toppled one after another at an historical pace. In governments in the Eastern Bloc, economies that were conceived as the provider of goods to their citizens, have failed miserably. Many of these countries are adopting market driven approaches to providing the goods and services by deregulation, de-centralized decision making, reduction in the bureaucratic influence, and empowerment of consumers.

²⁷John Sharp: Speech to the American Legislative Exchange Conference, April 16, 1994.

The current delivery system of education in Texas has many characteristics of these recently failed monopolistic approaches to providing services.²⁸

Although we argue that the educational delivery system itself is inefficient, many good and productive employees are themselves victims of the system as well. They are stifled by rules and regulations which impede their efforts, divert scarce resources from the classroom, prohibit innovation, and reduce standards. Reforming the system will free dedicated teachers and innovative administrators to provide many new opportunities for themselves and their students.

V. EFFICIENT SYSTEMS HAVE CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS

A. EFFICIENT INPUTS

Edgewood I held there "is no reason to think that efficient meant anything different in 1875 from what it now means. . . . Efficient conveys the meaning of effective or productive of results and connotes the use of resources so as to produce results with little waste; this meaning does not appear to have changed over time." Edgewood I, 777 S.W. 2d at 395. In developing an efficient system that utilizes resources with little waste, it is important to recognize a perspective of what would constitute an efficient system acceptable to the constitutional mandate.

²⁸ "Political institutions are the key to understanding why the public school system is not doing its job." See, Chubb and Moe, Politics and America's Schools, Brookings Institute (1991) at 27

The education system as a whole should not be wasteful, which is a natural result of over-centralization. Edgewood II expands upon this idea of institutional waste by pointing out "vast inefficiencies" in the system's structure. Edgewood II, 804 S.W. 2d at 497. Some counties have as many as 20 districts and some districts as few as 2 students. Duplication of mandated administrative costs are "unavoidable." Id.

Another element of institutional efficiency in the utilization of resources in wealthy districts to the same extent that state's remaining resources are used. "Substantial revenue is lost to the system," the court stated in Edgewood II. If property in the rich districts were taxed at the same amount as other property in the state, millions of dollars of tax money would accumulate. Id. at 497.

This institutional inefficiency results in the loss of money both in spending and taxing as well as a dispersing of funds that causes "gross disparities" in the amount spent per pupil. Such disparities are unacceptable to an efficient system of education as mandated by this court. Edgewood II, 804 S.W. 2d at 500 n.2 (Tex. 1991) (opinion on motion for rehearing). To remedy these inequalities and fall under an acceptable framework for efficiency, any plan must contain some elements of funding equalization. Edgewood II, 804 S.W. 2d at 496. Any system that does not remedy the underlying wastefulness of the school financing system would not pass the test as outlined in Edgewood II.

A key aspect of efficiency is the individual right in an efficient system. Some solutions include the distribution of monies on an equal per-pupil basis or to afford children a "substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds." Edgewood I, 777 S.W. 2d at 397. Therefore efficiency from the individual standpoint means a chance at receiving funds at or about the level of other districts.

A third aspect of efficiency is from the perspective of the taxpayer. Edgewood II states that a school system that is constitutionally efficient draws revenue from all property at a substantially similar rate. Such argument to this point has been in relation to ad valorem tax collection. Key to this point is the proposition that if different people pay significantly different rates for the same product, the system is inefficient.²⁹

Therefore, in any system designed to be efficient, the inputs of dollars should be thought of providing efficiency from the standpoint of the institution, the individual, and the taxpayer. Once inputs are established in an efficient manner, the question of outputs becomes the second building block of an efficient system.

²⁹See Generally, Parker & Weiss, "Litigating Edgewood: Constitutional Standards and Applications to Educational Choice," 10 Tex. Rev. Lit. 599 (1991) (analysis of efficiency and applications to constitutional standards).

B. EFFICIENT OUTPUTS

"Ultimately, 'efficiency' is about what Texas taxpayers get in return for the education dollars we spend."³⁰

Desired outputs depend on the values of society and of individuals. In a free society, efficiency of output is ultimately decided by consumer satisfaction. Efficiency, or producing results, can be measured by a production function.³¹

Outputs in an education system may be measured in student achievement. The results are measured in test scores and other measurable criteria. The test scores in Texas and especially the major districts indicate that educational achievements is less than admirable.

- * In 1981, Texas students scored 415 on the verbal portion of the SAT. In 1992, verbal scores for Texas students hit an all time low--410.

- * For decades, Texas students have scored well below national average on the SAT. This streak continues in 1993, when Texas students placed 17 points below the national average.³²

³⁰ Hayes, "Rethinking Robin Hood" National Center for Policy Analysis at 24

³¹ A production function is a description of the amounts of output expected from various combinations of inputs. See, Amacher & Ulbrich, Principles of Economics, (Fifth Edition) at 578

³²Figures from College Entrance Examination Board.

- * When comparing SAT scores among states where an equal or greater percentage of students took the SAT, in 1992 Texas ranked 19 out of 22.
- * A record 7.5% of Texas high school seniors in 1993 could not pass the state's high school graduation exam, the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills. Failure rates were highest among Black and Hispanic students.³³
- * Only 47% of fourth graders and 38% of eighth graders passed all three sections of the TAAS exam in 1993. Five percent fewer fourth graders passed the reading exam in 1993 than their counterparts did in 1992.³⁴
- * Recent test scores also show that many students who graduate from Texas high schools are not prepared for college-level work. Results from the Texas Academic Skills Program released in 1993 showed that nearly 30 percent of the students who enroll in Texas public colleges and universities need remedial education.³⁵

³³"Record Number Fail Graduation Exam," Dallas Morning News, May 25, 1993.

³⁴Id.

³⁵"TASP Scores Show Many Not Ready for College," Austin-American Statesman, July 25, 1993.

- * The Texas Education Agency cites 363 schools for "clearly unacceptable" standards, meaning no more than 20 percent of their students passed the TAAS exams given in grades 4,8, and 10. Another 5,568 schools were rated "acceptable" even though they could have had a failing rate as high as 79 percent.³⁶
- * One way to evaluate efficiency is to determine the variation of cost per unit of output. In Texas, the cost per student passing the TAAS test vary significantly from five thousand per student to over ninety thousand per student passing.³⁷

Another criterion for the evaluation of outputs of public school education is the measurement of drop-out rates. The state's major urban areas continue to have difficulty deterring students from dropping out of school, especially minorities.

- * In 1991-92, the estimated longitudinal drop-out rate for Hispanic students was 28.65%, for African-American students 25.37%, and for Native American students 25.79%. Asian-American students had a drop-out rate of 15.04%, while the rate among white students was 14.04%.

³⁶"Lawsuit to Use Ratings to Alter School Funding," Austin-American Statesman, August 18, 1993.

³⁷See Appendix D

- * Hispanic students are 2.2 times more likely and African American students 1.9 times more likely, to drop out of school than white students.
- * For every four Native American, Hispanic, or African American students entering the seventh grade, at least one will drop out of school.
- * The largest annual drop-out rate in 1991-92 occurred in the eight major urban school districts (Austin, Houston, Ft. Worth, Dallas, Corpus Christi, El Paso, Ysleta, and San Antonio). The 16,450 students who dropped out of these eight largest districts represent almost one-third of the state's total number of drop-outs.
- * Of the African-American students who dropped out of school in 1991-92, 50 percent dropped out of the state's eight major urban districts, compared to 16.3 percent in major suburban districts.
- * Of the total number of Hispanic students who dropped out of Texas schools in 1991-92, 35.5 percent dropped out of major districts, compared to 17.3 percent in major suburban districts.³⁸

³⁸1993-95 State Plan to Reduce the Dropout Rate, Texas Education Agency, May 1993 (all listed dropout statistics) (the number of dropouts has decreased by 41.4 percent since 1987-88).

Another way to evaluate productivity of the K - 12 education system is to assess satisfaction of those who deal with the products of the system. Therefore, the opinions of employers and college professors is valuable to such evaluation. Only 2.8% of Texas economics professors believe high school graduates are well prepared for college. Less than 6% believe the Texas public schools are doing a good job of providing a general diffusion of knowledge to Texas students.³⁹

C. EFFICIENT MODELS OF EDUCATION

"That standard deals with more than money, it mandates educational results."

Edgewood III, 816 S.W. 2d at 526 (Justice Cornyn concurring and dissenting).

Concern for educational results has not been confined to Texas. Throughout the country, reform movements have taken shape. Traditional approaches to education are not working.

For the last two decades, American public schools have tried various ways to improve performance. Many systems were in the process of reform before the 1983 presidential report, A Nation at Risk, forewarned of a "rising tide of mediocrity." Since the 1970's, reform movements have centered on innovations in curriculum, instruction, and numerous special programs. A stronger movement formed in the 1980's, but it was largely a continuation of the reform movement that began many years before.

³⁹ "Efficiency of Texas Public Education Delivery System", (Appendix B)

While these reform movements took various forms, there is little evidence that most reform movements that emphasized redistribution of monies and increased centralized control were successful in achieving desired results.⁴⁰

Some reform movements have generated results by non-traditional methods of education reform. In East Harlem, schools were the worst in New York City. In 1973, they ranked last in reading and math scores, with only 15 percent of students reading at grade level. But by 1981, there were no longer any traditional neighborhood junior high schools in East Harlem. Students began attending one of the 18 competing public schools chosen by parents rather than bureaucrats. As a result, East Harlem soon ranked 16th out of 32 districts in test scores, with 64 percent of its students reading at or above grade level. In 1973, only 7 percent of the students at Benjamin Franklin High School graduated. Currently called the Manhattan Center for Science and Math, by the late 1980's it sent 96 percent of its students to college.⁴¹

In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a parental selection program injected a market-oriented aspect in the educational delivery system. This program, instituted in 1990, allows over 600 low-income children to choose which nonsectarian school to attend.⁴² Parental

⁴⁰Chubb and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools.

⁴¹ See, John M. Hood, "Miracle on 109th Street", Reason, May 1989.

⁴² In March 1992 the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that the program does not violate the state's constitution. See "Polly's Victory," Wall Street Journal, October 1, 1993.

satisfaction with this program is not a concern. Research by Professor John F. Witte of the University of Wisconsin-Madison reports:

Parental attitudes toward choice schools, opinions of the choice program, and parental involvement were very positive in the first two years. Parental attitudes towards their schools and education of their children were much more positive than their evaluations of their prior public schools...Also they overwhelmingly believed the program should continue.⁴³

Many of the ideas for attaining a more results-oriented school system have been researched. Data assembled by researchers John Chubb and Terry Moe suggest that effective results attained by schools achieved by four basic factors: (1) Schools do not achieve effective results when they are told how to operate, rather than developing their own organizations. (2) Decentralized decision-making allows more authority and discretion to the schools is critical to success. (3) Schools with greater autonomy produce better results. The most promising method, found by Moe and Chubb, to preserve autonomy and accountability is a system that uses market incentives, rather than a system of detailed political and administrative control. And (4) reform should include the end of the monopoly that public school systems have over the supply of schools.⁴⁴

⁴³ John F. Witte, Andrea F. Biley, and Christopher A. Thorn, Second Year Report: Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (Madison: University of Wisconsin, December 1992), P. iv.

⁴⁴ John Chubb and Terry Moe, "Give Choice a Chance," Making Government Work: A Conservative Agenda for the States, (San Antonio: Texas Public Policy Foundation, 1992), p.38.

Such studies and examples emphasize the benefits of a market-oriented delivery system of education. Parents and students, consumers of education, should have greater control over the course of the education by the student than the central bureaucrats.

An efficient school system cannot be achieved through simple control of the inputs to the system (and certainly not through control of funding alone); the outputs of the system must be monitored and measured against a standard and the inputs must then be adjusted to correct any deficiencies. Edgewood III, 826 S.W. 2d at 529.

(emphasis added)

Any examination of the legislation with respect to the efficient production of outputs (student achievement) must consider the structure of the system and how the structure influences outputs.

VI. SENATE BILL 7 PERPETUATES AN INEFFICIENT SYSTEM

Revamping the public schools must be America's number one economic and social priority.⁴⁵

Senate Bill 7 is another version of the existing system with a different name. Its primary design is continued reliance on property taxes. However, SB 7 increases reliance on these taxes more than past funding formulas. The focus of SB 7 is again on inputs, not on outputs. This law does not provide for autonomous schools, mobility between districts or individual schools, or curtail the growth of bureaucracy.

The effects of SB 7 will be perverse. An increase in bureaucrats necessary to monitor the new provisions will add to the

⁴⁵ Rothschild, Bionomics-Economy as Ecosystem, at 318

already non-productive bureaucracy. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. sec. 36.004 (requires the Commissioner of Education to review the wealth of each school district in the state and to propose the annexation of property or consolidation if wealth distribution exceeds equalized wealth levels). SB 7 will also increase central decision-making. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. sec. 36.007 (Commissioner of Education to approve boundary changes) TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. Subchapter G (Detachment and Annexation by Commissioner of Education) TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. Subchapter H (Consolidation by Commissioner of Education) SB 7 will increase reliance on property wealth. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. Subchapter F. (Tax Base Consolidation).

Elements of what Moe and Chubb have found to constitute efficient schools are not to be found in the text of SB 7: (1) centralized decision-making is increased, not decreased; (2) schools are not allowed to develop their own organizations; (3) no market mechanism is present to minimize political and administrative control; and (4) state controlled public schools continue to have a monopoly with no provision for competition or supply-side change.

A poll of economics professors in Texas confirms the understanding of many citizens that the education system is performing badly. Out of 233 responses to a poll asking these educators in Texas universities about their perception of the Texas public schools, only 3.7% responded that government-run service providers are more efficient than privately run service providers.

Also, 82.7% said that when consumers are allowed to choose between different providers of a service, the system of delivery of that service becomes more efficient. In addition, 86.9% of those polled stated that a system that allows new providers to enter the market, and poor performers to fail is more efficient than a system in which the providers are protected.⁴⁶

On the performance of the Texas public schools, only 2.8% of the professors responded that Texas high school seniors were well-prepared. Only 5.6% of those responding to the poll believed that the Texas public schools were doing a good job in providing a general diffusion of knowledge. Only 3.7% of these economists believed that the current educational delivery system is efficient.⁴⁷

VII. THE TEST FOR AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

The whole world is being swept by a realization that markets have tremendous advantages over central control and bureaucracy.⁴⁸

An efficient delivery system of education must utilize market forces. If any structural change to the Texas public schools is to occur; parents, students, and communities must be allowed to act as consumers of education with the ability to respond to market forces. This includes the option to remove children from a school where the parent perceives that the student is not receiving an

⁴⁶ See Appendix B

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Moe and Chubb, School Reform in Great Britain, at 46

adequate education and place them in another school without penalty to that parent or student.

The delivery system of education should encourage less central control and give more autonomy to local districts and schools. An efficient delivery system of education will allow more direct control by the consumers of education (i.e. parents, students, and communities), to foster innovation, competition, and promote the best use of resources to meet that community's needs and desires.

Entry of new educational providers should not be restricted. The proliferation of new and innovative schools, able to compete with the public schools, should not be inhibited by obstacles designed to limit the entrance of competition to the delivery system of public education. These schools should be encouraged to flourish and provide a service to willing parents and students.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For Texans to be able to achieve their dreams, changes in Texas' bureaucratic educational system must happen. The initiative has begun. . . but further sweeping changes need to be made.⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

The Texas Constitution requires a "efficient" education system. The current system is not "effective or productive of results"⁵⁰ and, therefore, not efficient as defined by this Court. As this Court stated in Edgewood I "the system itself must be

⁴⁹ John Sharp, Forces of Change at 257

⁵⁰ Edgewood I, 777 S.W. 2d at 395

changed." The taxpayers and children of Texas must rely on the wisdom of this Court.

"All who have meditated on the art of governing mankind are convinced that the fate of empires depends on the education of youth."

ARISTOTLE

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Amicus Curiae respectfully requests that this Court declare the system of education in Texas unconstitutional, and direct the legislature to design a system of education consistent with the aforementioned guidelines.

Respectfully Submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amicus Curiae Brief has been properly mailed, first class, to all counsel of record as listed below in accordance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on this _____ day of May 1994.

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APPENDIX A

**Federal Reserve
Working Paper No. 9408**

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
May 12, 1994

Representative Kent Grusendorf
P.O. Box 2910
Austin, TX 78768-2910

Dear Representative Grusendorf,

Here is the clean copy that you requested. The article will be published as Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas working paper #9408.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lori L. Taylor", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Lori L. Taylor
Senior Economist

On the Political Economy of School Deregulation

S. Grosskopf, K. Hayes, L. Taylor, and W. Weber*

Abstract

Deregulation is a basic component of school reform. Without deregulation, schools could not respond to the incentive changes at the heart of more sophisticated reform proposals. Therefore, understanding the effects of deregulation on various interest groups provides insight into the political dynamics of the broader reform debate.

In this paper, we simulate the likely impacts of deregulation. The simulation indicates that parents and students in poor school districts with a relatively high proportion of minority students are resource constrained rather than bounded by regulation in pursuing better education for their students. The potential gains from deregulation increase as property wealth and expenditures per student increase. The simulation also indicates that in regulation-constrained school districts, many education professionals are extracting rents (in terms of excess employment) from the current system, and that deregulation and incentives for increased efficiency would lead many school districts to substitute teacher aides for teachers, administrators, and professional staff.

Revised April 14, 1994

(Preliminary Draft - Please Do Not Quote)

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In the decade since the publication of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform (Gardner et al., 1983), Americans have become increasingly concerned about improving education. Many types of reform have been proposed to address these concerns. Yet, despite all the rhetoric, few signs of substantive change are evident. In part, the delay in changing the school system reflects uncertainty about the relative efficacy of the various reform proposals. But in the minds of many of the reformers, too much of the delay reflects opposition from interest groups that do not expect to benefit from reform (for example, see Chubb and Moe 1990).

In this paper, we use simulation techniques to examine the distributional consequences of a basic component of educational reform -- eliminating regulations on the allocation of school personnel. Without deregulation, schools would be unable to respond to the incentives offered by more sophisticated reform proposals such as voucher plans or site-based management. Thus, understanding the effects of deregulation on various interest groups provides insight into the political dynamics of the broader reform debate.

A priori, we expect that some schools efficiently allocate their resources despite the regulations. Producing higher educational outcomes at these schools would require additional expenditures. We refer to these schools as resource constrained. The remaining schools are regulation constrained. We expect that deregulation would lead to a reallocation of resources and higher educational outcomes at these schools. For the regulation-constrained schools, we also expect that some types of personnel are earning economic rents from the status quo and would be employed less intensively after reform. Necessarily, other types of personnel would be employed more intensively.

Classifying schools and personnel types in this way reveals the likely supporters and opponents of reform. Residents of regulation-constrained school districts would logically support deregulation, as would personnel groups that would be employed more intensively in the absence of regulation. Residents of resource-constrained school districts are likely to favor reforms that redistribute resources over reforms that deregulate schools. Furthermore, if relative differences in school quality are capitalized into property values, then residents of resource-constrained school districts might oppose deregulation because it would erode their position relative to regulation-constrained school districts. Finally, one would expect that personnel groups that are currently overemployed relative to their compensation would anticipate losses in employment after deregulation and would rationally oppose it.

Our simulated deregulation of public school districts in Texas indicates that most school districts are regulation constrained rather than resource constrained, a conclusion that is perfectly consistent with the state legislature's tendency to micromanage education.¹ The simulation also indicates that school administrators, teachers and professional staff (such as counselors) are likely to lose employment through deregulation, while teacher aides are likely to gain employment. Finally, the simulation reveals that resource-constrained school districts differ significantly from regulation-constrained districts. In general, resource-constrained school districts have a greater proportion of minority and low income students, less property wealth per pupil and lower per pupil expenditures.

¹ For example, the legislature sets hiring standards, maximum class sizes and teacher compensation schedules.

These results suggest that reform will remain an important issue because it benefits large, politically influential groups of parents. However, even basic reforms like deregulation may continue to be difficult to achieve because teachers and other members of the educational establishment are better organized than the likely beneficiaries of such reform.

I. The Literature

A substantial literature illustrates inefficiencies in the education system. Eric A. Hanushek's 1986 survey of the literature on educational production functions overwhelmingly concludes that expenditures are uncorrelated with student achievement gains. Cost function studies and data envelopment analyses also indicate that the system is inefficient (see, for example, Bessent et al. 1982, Färe, et al. 1989 or Callan and Santerre 1990).

The literature also points to regulation as one of the sources of inefficiency. For example, despite considerable evidence that smaller class sizes and more-educated teachers do not promote achievement (Hanushek 1986), governments like the Texas state legislature continue to regulate class sizes and teacher credentials.

Fortunately, by exploiting the characteristics of our theoretical model, we can infer from data observed in a regulated environment how resources could be allocated if the regulations were removed. This technique allows us to make three important contributions to the literature. First, we simulate a deregulated environment and measure the potential outcome gain over the status quo, thereby differentiating between the resource-constrained school districts (those that are unable to improve via deregulation) and the regulation-constrained school districts (those that would improve with deregulation). Second, we examine community characteristics to determine if particular types

of school districts are disproportionately classified as regulation constrained and therefore harmed by regulation. Finally, to support our conjectures concerning impediments to reform, we use information on the deregulated personnel allocation to measure the extent of economic rents accruing to school district personnel from the status quo.

II. The Model

We model educational decision-making under the status quo and under deregulation using the direct and indirect distance functions, respectively. Distance functions accommodate agents seeking to maximize output in both a regulated environment with input constraints and a deregulated environment with merely a budget constraint. This approach also allows for the status quo resource allocation to be nested within the budget constrained resource allocation so that the deregulation can be appropriately simulated.

Although most analyses of education use either a cost or production function approach, we feel neither of these is appropriate for the problem at hand. First, cost function estimation presumes that the decision maker is attempting to minimize cost, while public sector officials are trying to maximize output. Because production functions are single-output representations of technology, they have limited use in modeling multioutput education technologies. In neither case can the cost or production function provide a straightforward and comparable simulation of the status quo and deregulated environment.

To model the regulated status quo, we use the direct output distance function. As described by Shephard (1970), the direct output distance function can be defined as

$$D_o(x_f, x_v, y) = \min \{ \theta : y/\theta \in P(x_f, x_v) \}, \quad (1)$$

where x_f is a vector of fixed input quantities, x_v is a vector of variable input quantities, y is a vector of output quantities, and $1/\theta$ gives the proportion by which all outputs can be expanded and still remain feasible given the direct production possibilities set, $P(x_f, x_v)$.² As in a regulated environment, the input vector $x = (x_f, x_v)$ is treated as exogenously determined in this description of technology. We assume that administrators initially face this technology under the regulated organizational structure.

We use the indirect output distance function to model a deregulated educational environment in which administrators face a budget constraint but are free to choose their variable inputs as long as they satisfy that budget constraint. Shephard (1974) defines the indirect output distance function as

$$ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y) = \min \{ \lambda : y/\lambda \in IP(x_f, p_v/c) \}, \quad (2)$$

where c is total variable cost, p_v is a vector of variable-input prices, and $1/\lambda$ is the maximum proportion by which all outputs can be expanded and still be feasible given the indirect (budget-constrained) production possibilities set, $IP(x_f, p_v/c)$. The set $IP(x_f, p_v/c)$ is the largest production possibility set allowing x_v to vary while satisfying the budget constraint $(p_v' x_v \leq c)$.³

Figure 1 illustrates the direct and indirect output distance functions for a typical school district that produces two outputs. The set $P(x_f, x_v)$, which describes the best practice technology under the status quo, gives all possible combinations of the two outputs that can be produced with the

² By definition, all of the elements of the x and y vectors are contained in the nonnegative real line.

³ This interpretation of $IP(\cdot)$ was first established in Färe and Shephard (1980).

regulated input bundle (x_f, x_v) . Suppose that a particular school district has observed output bundle A, which it produces from its given input bundle x_A . The direct distance function tells us how far that observed bundle is from the frontier of the direct technology, $P(x_f, x_v)$, holding the mix of outputs constant. The direct distance function $(D_o(x_f, x_v, y))$ equals the ratio OA/OU , where U represents the maximum output feasible within $P(x_f, x_v)$, given the observed output mix and input bundle (i.e., the status quo). The inverse of this ratio $(1/\theta)$ can be interpreted as a measure of technical efficiency.

The set $IP(x_f, p_v/c)$, which describes the deregulated technology, gives all the possible combinations of two outputs that can be produced given the school district's budget constraint (c) and variable-input prices (p_v). The school district is allowed to choose variable inputs as long as x_v satisfies the budget constraint. Because $IP(x_f, p_v/c)$ offers more choices than $P(x_f, x_v)$, $P(x_f, x_v)$ is a subset of $IP(x_f, p_v/c)$. The indirect output distance function $(ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y))$ tells us how far the observed output bundle is from the frontier of the indirect or budget-constrained (deregulated) technology, $IP(x_f, p_v/c)$. In Figure 1, $ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y)$ equals the ratio OA/OT .

The direct and indirect distance functions have several useful properties. They take on values less than or equal to one as long as y is feasible. Values of one indicate that observed output is on the boundary of the respective production possibility set.⁴ Equivalently, values of one

⁴ Formally,

$$\begin{aligned} D_o(x_f, x_v, y) &\leq 1 \Leftrightarrow y \in P(x_f, x_v) \\ D_o(x_f, x_v, y) &= 1 \Leftrightarrow y \in Isoq P(x_f, x_v) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y) &\leq 1 \Leftrightarrow y \in IP(x_f, p_v/c) \\ ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y) &= 1 \Leftrightarrow y \in Isoq IP(x_f, p_v/c) \end{aligned}$$

indicate that the particular school district is technically efficient in the sense of Farrell (1957).⁵

Because relaxing constraints necessarily allows for greater potential output, allowing school districts to choose inputs subject to a budget constraint instead of facing the initial, regulated input vector may increase their output. We can simulate the potential increase from deregulation by exploiting the relationship between the direct and indirect output distance functions:

$$p'_\nu x_\nu \leq c \Rightarrow ID_o(x_f, p_\nu/c, y) \leq D_o(x_f, x_\nu, y). \quad (3)$$

The relationship reflects the fact that a deregulated school district could always choose the input bundle it uses under the status quo and potentially could increase output in a deregulated environment.

For this analysis, we measure the gains in potential output from this simulated deregulation as the ratio of the maximum potential output achievable in the deregulated environment (y/λ), divided by the maximum potential output achievable in the regulated environment (y/θ):

$$GAIN = D_o(x_f, x_\nu, y) / ID_o(x_f, p_\nu/c, y). \quad (4)$$

Thus, the measure of gain from deregulation represents additional potential output above and beyond that which could be achieved by becoming technically efficient given the initial allocation (in the sense of Farrell). In Figure 1, GAIN is represented by OT/OU.

The school district represented in Figure 1 as point A is an example of a regulation-constrained observation. The potential output lost due to regulation for this school district is measured by OT/OU (GAIN). If a school

⁵In fact, the direct output distance function is the reciprocal of Farrell output-increasing technical efficiency.

district is observed at a point like T , then it is termed resource constrained because it is unable to improve on its resource allocation in response to deregulation. That is, the school district's resource decisions have not been changed by the regulation, and the only way to increase educational outcomes is to provide additional resources, perhaps through reform that redistributes revenues among school districts.

The next step is to develop a technique for measuring GAIN. First we must obtain measures of inputs, input prices and outputs as well as the budget constraint for a set of observations. Then we need to compute the values of D_0 and ID_0 for each observation in the data set.

The Data

We apply the distance-function approach described in the previous section to a sample of 144 urban Texas school districts operating in 1989. The sample includes school districts with enrollments between 1,000 and 5,000 for which complete data were available. We restrict the sample to urban school districts of moderate size because we wanted to choose a subset of school districts with a common educational technology.⁶ Anecdotal information suggests that very large and very small school districts face substantially different production technologies. Data on school district inputs come from the Texas Research League. We extract estimates of school district outputs and quasi-fixed inputs that are beyond school district control from data provided by the Texas Education Agency.

Our data on school district inputs includes four variable inputs -- administrators (AD), teachers (TEACH), professional support staff (SUP) and

⁶ As the empirical appendix illustrates, the analysis is robust to a number of data specifications.

teaching aides (AIDE) -- and one quasi-fixed capital input -- operating and maintenance expenditures (MAINT). The input price data consists of average annual salaries paid to school administrators, teachers, support staff and teacher aides. Because we consider the capital input as quasi-fixed and beyond school district control in the short run, the relevant measure of the budget each school district faces is the total cost per student of hiring the four personnel inputs.

The literature on measuring school effects has reached a broad consensus that the most appropriate measure of schooling product is the marginal effect of the school on educational outcomes (see, for example, Hanushek 1986, Hanushek and Taylor 1990, Aitkin and Longford 1986 or Boardman and Murnane 1979). We use student achievement on a battery of test scores as the relevant educational outcome and extract the marginal effect of schools by following the value-added residuals techniques described in Hanushek and Taylor and Aitkin and Longford.

Thus, we estimate school district output, using Texas Educational Assessment of Minimum Skills (TEAMS) scores in mathematics, reading and writing; data on changes in cohort size; and demographic data on the racial and socioeconomic composition of the student body (Texas Education Agency 1987, 1989). For each of four grade levels--3rd, 5th, 9th and 11th--we estimate the value added by the school district according to equation (5):

$$TEAMS89_{i,g} = \alpha_g + \sum_{j=1}^3 \delta_{j,g} ETHNICITY_{i,j} + \delta_{4,g} SES_i + \delta_{5,g} XCOHORT_{i,g} + \sum_{j=6}^8 \delta_{j,g} TEAMS87_{i,j,g-2} + \epsilon_{i,g}, \quad g=3,5,9,11, \quad (5)$$

where $TEAMS89_{i,g}$ is the average total TEAMS score for school district i for grade level g in 1989, $TEAMS87_{i,j,g-2}$ is the average TEAMS score in subject j (reading, writing and mathematics) for the same cohort two years earlier, $ETHNICITY_{i,j}$ is the fraction of the student body of school district i that is Asian, black or Hispanic (respectively), SES_i is the fraction of the student body of school district i that is receiving free or reduced-price lunches (the best available proxy for socioeconomic status), $XCOHORT_{i,g}$ is the percentage change in the size of the grade g cohort between 1987 and 1989 (a control to prevent schools from improving their average score by shedding students), and the estimated residual, $\epsilon_{i,g}$, represents the average value added in school district i in grade g .⁷ We present these equation estimates in Table 1.⁸

Estimating school outputs as equation residuals generates output measures that represent deviations from the state average. School districts that add less value than the state average have negative output measures. Because our computational technique is not designed for negative outputs, we transform the value-added residuals into tractable output measures by adding

⁷ We expected a correlation between school effects across grade levels in the same school district and, therefore, a cross-equations correlation between the error terms. We found that the correlations between error terms were surprisingly low (in the neighborhood of 0.20) but significant, and therefore we estimated the output measures simultaneously using the standard SAS package for seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).

⁸ These estimates are calculated using all 604 Texas school districts for which we had test data. This approach greatly increases the degrees of freedom with which OUTPUT and STUINPUT are measured. In restricting the sample for further analysis to medium-sized, urban school districts, we implicitly assume that the coefficients of equation 5 are stable across all sub-samples of our data.

the estimated value of the intercept from each equation to the value-added residual for that equation. Therefore, y is measured by:

$$OUTPUT_{1,g} = \hat{\alpha}_g + \hat{\epsilon}_{1,g}. \quad (6)$$

In addition to estimates of marginal school effects, equation 5 also yields estimates of predicted achievement for school districts. In this setting, predicted achievement is attributable to student body characteristics that are beyond school district control in the current period. Formally,

$$STUINPUT_{1,g} = \sum_{j=1}^3 \hat{\delta}_{j,g} ETHNICITY_1 + \hat{\delta}_{4,g} SES_1 + \hat{\delta}_{5,g} XCOHORT_{1,g} + \sum_{j=6}^8 \hat{\delta}_{j,g} TEAMS87_{1,j,g-2}. \quad (7)$$

Thus, the $STUINPUT_{1,g}$ measures the contribution of home and previous school production, which we treat as quasi-fixed inputs (χ_f), i.e., inputs over which the school district has no control. Our proxy of the value added by the school district, $OUTPUT_{1,g}$ from equation 6, is achievement purged of the effects of home production and earlier achievement-test gains.⁹

Table 2 includes descriptive statistics for each of the four variable school district inputs, one fixed school district input, four fixed household inputs, four outputs, enrollment and costs. These statistics, especially the means and standard deviations, indicate that teacher-pupil ratios vary less than the ratios of the other types of personnel to enrollment, reflecting perhaps de facto restrictions on class size. Personnel expenditures per pupil (VARCOST) vary from a low of about \$1,300 to a high of nearly \$3,000 per year.

⁹ We note that this general technique was also employed by Callan and Santerre (1990) to arrive at a measure of educational quality. However, Callan and Santerre did not have access to pretest information and, therefore, were unable to derive a value-added quality measure.

The Empirical Results

We calculate $D_o(x_f, x_v, y)$ and $ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y)$ for each school district in our sample, using the nonparametric linear programming approach described in the technical appendix. In calculating $D_o(x_f, x_v, y)$, all inputs are treated as fixed by the regulations. In calculating $ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y)$, we allow the school district to hypothetically choose the levels of the four types of personnel, subject to a budget constraint equal to the total personnel expenditure per pupil observed in the school district. We solve for the optimal variable input levels as part of the problem (see appendix). Input prices are assumed fixed at the observed salary averages, and the technologies are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale.¹⁰ For both direct and indirect output distance functions, a school district is judged efficient (i.e., its students are reaching best practice achievement levels, given its resources) if the value of the distance function is one. Inefficient school districts will have measures less than one. These school districts are not reaching best practice achievement levels.

We report summary statistics for $(D_o(x_f, x_v, y))^{-1}$, $(ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y))^{-1}$ and GAIN $(D_o(x_f, x_v, y)/ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y))$ in Table 3. On average, the maximum proportion by which output could be expanded under regulation, $(D_o(x_f, x_v, y))^{-1}$ is 1.032. Under deregulation, the average maximum proportion by which output could be expanded, $(ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y))^{-1}$ is 1.074. The average potential gain from allowing school districts to choose variable inputs subject to budget constraints rather than taking their initial variable input levels as fixed is 1.041. That is, on average, school districts could increase value added by 3.2 percent $((D_o(x_f, x_v, y))^{-1} - 1)$ if they used their initial input bundle

¹⁰ As the empirical appendix indicates, relaxing this assumption leads to qualitatively similar results.

efficiently and an additional 4.1 percent if they could reallocate inputs efficiently.¹¹ Given constant returns to scale, a potential 4.1 percent gain in output from reallocating personnel inputs implies that deregulated school districts could reduce personnel expenditures by 4.1 percent without reducing output. Regulation-constrained school districts could increase their output by 4.9 percent, on average, if the regulations were removed. Thus, the simulation suggests that regulations on resource allocation add substantially to the cost of education in Texas.

Because solving the indirect output distance function yields the variable input vector each school district would choose if it were not subject to the initial regulatory environment, (x_v^*) , we can also use it to identify the personnel groups that would gain and lose employment under deregulation and the distribution of economic rents in the initial allocation.¹² An input is said to be earning economic rents when that input's price exceeds its marginal product or, equivalently, when it is overutilized relative to its compensation.

Table 4 describes the aggregate effects of deregulation on the 144 school districts in our sample. The first line of table 4 gives the total initial expenditures on each of the four variable inputs. The second line of the table illustrates how school districts would redistribute their initial budgets after deregulation. The expenditures for each personnel category represent optimal input quantities multiplied by the (given) input prices

¹¹ In a related study using parametric estimation techniques, Grosskopf, Hayes, Taylor and Weber (1992) find a greater degree of inefficiency (on the order of 25 percent for the indirect output distance function case). We attribute the difference in magnitudes of technical inefficiency to the differences in technique.

¹² The optimal variable input vector is the solution to problem A2 in the technical appendix.

$(p_j x_{vj}^*)$, summed across all school districts in the sample. The third line of the table indicates how deregulated school districts would allocate their expenditures if their variable budget equaled the minimum amount necessary to achieve the initial output level in a deregulated environment. We determine the minimum-variable-cost budget by exploiting the properties of the indirect output distance function. Recall that the indirect output distance function indicates that school districts could increase output by an average of 7.4 percent by becoming technically efficient in a deregulated environment. Assuming constant returns to scale, this implies that the school districts could maintain their initial levels of output and decrease personnel expenditures by 7.4 percent. For each school district, the minimum personnel expenditure needed to achieve the initial output level in a deregulated environment would be $ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y) \cdot \text{VARCOST}$. As before, the optimal variable-input vector (x_v^*) indicates the optimal mix of inputs under deregulation (assuming constant returns to scale). Thus, the expenditures for each personnel category represent optimal input quantities multiplied by the (given) input prices and scaled by the value of the indirect output distance function $(ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y) \cdot p_j x_{vj}^*)$, summed across all school districts in the sample.

One conclusion we draw from this simulation is that there are substantial economic rents to protect from school reform. Comparing lines 1 and 3 in Table 4, one can see that deregulated school districts could reduce their aggregate personnel expenditures by \$49.6 million without reducing output from initial levels. The simulation indicates that expenditures on teachers could decrease by 9 percent (or \$41.3 million), expenditures on administrators by 21 percent and expenditures on professional support staff by 20 percent without reducing student achievement, provided that expenditures on

teacher aides increased. Because teacher aides are highly productive relative to their compensation, expenditures on aides would need to increase by 67 percent (\$20.4 million) to maintain initial output levels. Apparently, teachers, administrators and support staff are earning economic rents, while teacher aides are severely underutilized.

A second conclusion we draw from the simulation is that as a group education professionals are rational to oppose school deregulation. The current dissatisfaction with student achievement makes it likely that school districts would respond to deregulation by increasing output, subject to their initial budget constraints. Comparing lines 1 and 2 in Table 4 indicates that if initial funding levels were maintained but schools were deregulated, school districts would reallocate resources away from teachers, administrators and professional staff and toward teacher aides. While expenditures on teachers would decline less than 1 percent, expenditures on administrators and professional support staff would decline 15 percent and 14 percent, respectively.

A third conclusion we can draw from the simulation is that the consequences of deregulation are not monolithic. Total employment of teachers, administrators and professional staff would decline if school districts were allowed to reallocate resources, but the simulation does not imply that all school districts overutilize education professionals. Comparing the initial variable-input vector, (x_v) , to the optimal variable-input vector, (x_v^*) , reveals that nearly 30 percent of the school districts would respond to deregulation by increasing teacher employment, indicating that teachers are underutilized in those jurisdictions. A similar proportion of jurisdictions would increase hiring of professional staff. Although administrators as a

class are substantially overutilized, 21 school districts would hire more administrators if allowed to do so.

Like school district personnel, parents, students and other area residents have an interest in school reform. The simulation also allows us to identify the household characteristics of school districts that would change under deregulation. We hypothesize that voters would favor deregulation in school districts where the simulation indicates that output would increase under deregulation (or expenditures would fall). Because many people expect relative school quality and school taxes to be capitalized into property values, and because school districts that did not improve under deregulation would see their relative quality/tax positions deteriorate, we also predict voter opposition in school districts that the simulation indicates would not improve with deregulation.

We find an interesting pattern in the distribution of school districts that would and would not gain from deregulation (Table 5). Our simulation indicates that 25 school districts are resource constrained and are already as efficient as they would be under deregulation, while 119 school districts would gain from deregulation. On average, the school districts that would gain from deregulation (regulation-constrained districts) have fewer minority students, fewer students receiving reduced-price lunches, higher property values and higher expenditures per pupil than school districts that would not gain from deregulation (resource-constrained districts).¹³ Furthermore, the amount by which a school district would gain from deregulation is a decreasing function of that district's state aid and an increasing function of its

¹³ Student's t-tests of the difference between means for these household characteristics indicate that school districts that would gain from deregulation are significantly different from school districts that would not gain.

property wealth and expenditures. One would expect the resource-constrained districts to support reform that redistributes resources across districts rather than the within-district reallocation induced by deregulation.

Our simulation indicates that the primary beneficiaries of school deregulation would be teacher aides and affluent, white school districts. Groups that would not gain from deregulation include the education professionals and resource-constrained school districts, which are typically poorer, minority school districts. Therefore, we expect that school deregulation would be more popular among affluent, white parents and teacher aides than among poorer, minority parents or education professionals. In fact, some anecdotal evidence suggests that the primary supporters of school reform proposals such as school choice have been businesses and affluent parent groups, while most of the teachers' organizations have firmly opposed reforms that do not involve more money for education (Finn 1992).

Care must be taken in interpreting our results however. Recent surveys regarding school choice via a voucher system have found that minority urban residents are supporters of vouchers (Lieberman 1993). We emphasize that our deregulation results correspond to greater choice with respect to resources used in the production of education and do not reflect the outcome of greater demand-side choice. Because the student inputs entering the distance function are treated as fixed, the simulation does not model demand-side choice. We also point out that the deregulation simulation is relative to the best practice technology currently employed by school districts operating in the public sector. Since private and public schools may produce a different mix of educational public goods (for example, private schools might promote religious themes while public schools might promote cultural diversity and integration), the deregulation simulation does not measure how well the public

schools in our sample would perform if they operated as private schools outside the confines of the public sector.

This simulation is fairly conservative in the sense that school districts are only allowed to reallocate within the bounds of their initial personnel budgets, given average personnel salaries. Because we assume that all teachers are paid the average salary in their school district, we do not allow for the substitution of less experienced teachers for more experienced (and presumably more expensive) teachers. Because Hanushek (1986) found no systematic correlation between expensive teacher characteristics--like educational attainment and experience--and student achievement gains, such substitutions could be cost effective. On the other hand, we do allow for reallocation across individual schools within a school district.

The simulation also represents *potential* changes in school district allocations. If school districts are sufficiently insulated from market forces, they may not respond to deregulation by reallocating resources to maximize their output. However, the reasonably low level of technical inefficiency in the initial allocation suggests that school districts do face some incentives to operate on the production possibilities frontier and, therefore, that our approach is a credible simulation of school district behavior after deregulation.

We also note that, as with any analysis, there may be room for improvement. We would like to replicate the simulation using data on individual schools rather than school districts, and incorporating data on private schools. While we feel that value added in basic skills is a reasonable measure of school district output, one might also wish to include other types of outputs such as graduation rates, school continuation rates or some measure of labor-force outcomes.

However, as the empirical appendix demonstrates, the estimation is fairly robust to a number of alternative model specifications. These alternative models check for robustness with respect to analyzing nonurban as well as urban school districts, allowing school districts to face a variable returns to scale technology, allowing enrollment outside the range of 1,000-5,000 students, and using average TEAMS scores rather than values added as the measures of school district output.¹⁴ The Spearman correlation coefficients for the rank of the school district GAIN score across the various models indicated a significant positive correlation. Significant differences between resource-constrained and regulation-constrained school districts persist across the alternative specifications. For all of the alternative models, resource-constrained school districts have a greater proportion of poorer, minority students than regulation-constrained school districts.

Conclusions

To identify the distributional consequences of a basic component of educational reform, we simulate the deregulation of 144 school districts in Texas by using a distance-function methodology. This approach allows us to model school districts as producers of a vector of net improvements in student achievement, given student characteristics. By comparing the direct and indirect distance functions, we can simulate the potential gains in achievement from removing restrictions on the use of school district personnel while requiring that school districts remain within the financial constraints of their initial budgets.

¹⁴ For comparability, all of these alternative specifications maintain the same number of inputs and outputs.

Our simulation indicates that there are substantial differences in the consequences of school reform for different educational interest groups. Parents and students in school districts that are poor and have a relatively high proportion of minority students have little to gain from deregulation. These schools seem to be resource constrained rather than regulation constrained. On average, they are already using their inputs more efficiently than wealthier school districts with fewer minority students. In contrast, school districts that would gain from deregulation tend to have relatively few minority students, relatively few poor students and substantial property wealth per pupil. Furthermore, the potential gains from deregulation increase as property wealth and expenditures per student increase. Therefore, we would expect that affluent parents would prefer educational reforms that deregulate schools, while poorer parents, who are less likely to gain from deregulation, would prefer educational reforms that redistribute schooling resources among schools.

Our simulation also indicates that deregulation and incentives for increased efficiency, would, on average, lead many school districts to substitute teacher aides for teachers, administrators and professional staff such as guidance counselors. Apparently, many education professionals are extracting rents (in terms of excess employment) from the current system. Therefore, it is rational for these groups to oppose educational reform.

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Technical Appendix

There are several ways to calculate $D_o(\chi_f, \chi_\nu, y)$ and $ID_o(\chi_f, p_\nu/c, y)$. Here we use the nonparametric linear programming approach, which is closely related to data envelopment analysis (DEA). In this approach, we exploit the reciprocal relationship between Farrell technical efficiency and the distance functions. Specifically, for each school district $i' = 1, \dots, I$, we calculate

$$(D_o(\chi_{i'f}, \chi_{i'\nu}, y_{i'}))^{-1} = \max_{\theta, z} \theta \quad (A1)$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^I z_i y_{im} - \theta y_{i'm} &\geq 0, m = 1, \dots, M \\ \sum_{i=1}^I z_i \chi_{if} &\leq \chi_{i'f}, f = 1, \dots, F \\ \sum_{i=1}^I z_i \chi_{i\nu} &\leq \chi_{i'\nu}, \nu = F + 1, \dots, N \\ z_i &\geq 0, i = 1, \dots, I \end{aligned}$$

and

$$(ID_o(\chi_{i'f}, p_{i'\nu}/c_{i'}, y_{i'}))^{-1} = \max_{\lambda, z, \chi_\nu} \lambda \quad (A2)$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^I z_i y_{im} - \lambda y_{i'm} &\geq 0, m = 1, \dots, M \\ \sum_{i=1}^I z_i \chi_{if} &\leq \chi_{i'f}, f = 1, \dots, F \\ \sum_{i=1}^I z_i \chi_{i\nu} &\leq \chi_\nu, \nu = F + 1, \dots, N \\ z_i &\geq 0, i = 1, \dots, I \\ \sum_{\nu=F+1}^N p_{i'\nu} \chi_\nu &\leq c_{i'}. \end{aligned}$$

The intensity vector z serves to construct convex combinations of the data to form the reference sets $P(\chi_f, \chi_v)$ and $IP(\chi_f, p_v/c)$. The restriction that the intensity variables be nonnegative allows the technology to exhibit constant returns to scale.¹ Note that the choice variables for the direct distance function (A1) are θ and z , while the choice variables for the indirect distance function problem (A2) are λ , z and χ_v . The prime notation denotes data for the observation (school district) under evaluation; thus $\chi_{i'v}$ refers to the observed vector of personnel inputs for school district i' . On the other hand, χ_v in the third set of constraints for the indirect distance function problem (A2) is a variable for which we solve.

Problems A1 and A2 are solved for each school district in our sample. For details, see Färe et al. (1988, 1993) or Färe and Grosskopf (1993).

¹ Variable returns to scale may be imposed by adding the constraint that the sum of the intensity variables equals one.

Table 1

Output Estimation
(Standard Errors)

	3rd Grade	5th Grade	9th Grade	11th Grade
Intercept	676.37 (27.97)	616.90 (25.70)	431.21 (31.25)	417.63 (20.55)
TEAMS87 _{math,j}	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)	0.08 (0.03)	0.24 (0.03)
TEAMS87 _{reading,j}	0.08 (0.06)	0.12 (0.05)	0.27 (0.08)	0.25 (0.04)
TEAMS87 _{writing,j}	0.15 (0.05)	0.17 (0.04)	0.17 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)
ASIAN	0.45 (0.71)	0.49 (0.61)	0.31 (0.55)	0.30 (0.35)
BLACK	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.23 (0.09)	-0.24 (0.06)
HISPANIC	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.003 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.04)
XCOHORT _j	-.48 (0.10)	-0.38 (0.09)	-0.40 (0.06)	-0.35 (0.05)
SES	-0.75 (0.11)	-0.57 (0.10)	-0.28 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.06)

Notes: System-weighted R-square is 0.4510.
Number of observations is 604.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Variable Inputs				
AD	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.014
TEACH	0.060	0.005	0.046	0.078
SUP	0.005	0.002	0.001	0.011
AIDES	0.009	0.005	0.001	0.030
Variable Input Prices				
AD_PAY	\$38,612	3659	\$30,409	\$52,920
TEACH_PAY	23,008	1595	20,166	29,509
SUP_PAY	27,049	2491	21,736	37,101
AIDE_PAY	9,514	1492	6,898	14,109
Fixed Inputs				
STUINPUT ₃	140.5	23.8	63.9	177.8
STUINPUT ₅	188.8	24.3	99.6	239.3
STUINPUT ₉	359.7	22.5	281.4	406.6
STUINPUT ₁₁	368.2	20.0	310.1	417.9
MAINT	361.1	116.3	141.8	736.7
Outputs (Value-added test scores by grade)				
OUTPUT ₃	676.7	25.6	568.5	749.5
OUTPUT ₅	616.3	22.0	538.8	680.2
OUTPUT ₉	429.1	21.2	377.6	487.1
OUTPUT ₁₁	416.3	11.5	383.4	440.9
Costs and Enrollment				
VARCOST/ENROLL	\$1,827.1	250.6	\$1,299.2	\$2,676.7
ENROLL	2,637.9	1,225.1	1,010.0	4,995.0

Table 3
Summary of Simulation Results
Mean Values
(Standard Deviation)

	Total	Regulation Constrained	Resource Constrained
$(D_o(x_f, x_v, y))^{-1}$	1.032 (0.038)	1.039 (0.039)	1.0000 (0.000)
$(ID_o(x_f, p_v/c, y))^{-1}$	1.074 (0.057)	1.090 (0.051)	1.0000 (0.000)
GAIN	1.041 (0.035)	1.049 (0.033)	1.0000 (0.000)
Observations	144	119	25

Table 4
How Deregulation Affects Sample Spending on Personnel

Expenditures: (in millions)	Teachers	Administrators	Staff	Aides	Total
Status quo	\$525.0	\$79.8	\$59.15	\$30.6	\$694.5
Deregulation:					
constant cost	520.7	67.5	51.0	55.2	\$694.5
constant output	483.7	62.8	47.4	51.0	\$644.9

Note: Rows may not sum due to rounding.

Table 5
Mean Characteristics of
Regulation-Constrained and Resource-Constrained School Districts

	Regulation Constrained	Resource Constrained
VARCOST	\$1,855.37 (22.46)	\$1,692.42 (47.50)
STATE AID PER STUDENT	\$1,511.69 (51.20)	\$2073.20 (81.93)
EXPENDITURES PER STUDENT	\$3,297.40 (62.84)	\$2850.84 (43.50)
NONWHITE	26.50 (2.14)	57.14 (7.62)
SES	26.23 (1.73)	53.68 (6.47)
MARKET VALUE PER STUDENT	\$185,260 (13,089)	\$80,024 (8,764)
OBSERVATIONS	119	25

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

Empirical Appendix

Effects on Total Personnel Expenditures (in millions)

	N	Teachers	Administrators	Staff	Aides
<u>Model I</u>					
Status Quo	144	525.0	79.8	59.1	30.6
Deregulation:					
constant cost	144	520.7	67.5	51.0	55.2
constant output	144	483.7	62.8	47.4	51.0
<u>Model II</u>					
Status Quo	144	525.0	79.8	59.1	30.6
Deregulation:					
constant cost	144	511.9	76.7	53.9	50.3
<u>Model III</u>					
Status Quo	314	1041.9	148.9	114.4	66.7
Deregulation:					
constant cost	314	1023.2	134.9	101.6	112.1
constant output	314	949.8	125.4	94.2	103.6
<u>Model IV</u>					
Status Quo	314	1041.9	148.9	114.4	66.7
Deregulation:					
constant cost	314	1036.3	145.4	104.1	83.4
<u>Model V</u>					
Status Quo	425	3681.3	496.8	453.2	222.8
Deregulation:					
constant cost	425	3664.5	472.2	399.2	318.0
constant output	425	3364.8	434.0	366.3	292.5
<u>Model VI</u>					
Status Quo	425	3681.3	496.8	453.2	222.8
Deregulation:					
constant cost	425	3646.5	488.7	397.6	321.1
constant output	425	3490.5	468.2	380.3	307.4

Notes: Model I: As reported in text, constant returns to scale (CRS), enrollment 1,000-5,000, urban school districts.
 Model II: Variable returns to scale (VRS), enrollment 1,000-5,000, urban school districts.
 Model III: CRS, enrollment 1,000-5,000, urban and non-urban school districts.
 Model IV: VRS, enrollment 1,000-5,000, urban and non-urban school districts.
 Model V: CRS, no upper bound on enrollment, urban and non-urban school districts.
 Model VI: CRS, TEAMS average scores (rather than value added) for output, no upper bound on enrollment, urban and non-urban school districts.

Empirical Appendix cont.

Mean Characteristics of Regulation-Constrained (G)
and Resource-Constrained (NG) School Districts

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	G	NG	G	NG	G	NG
GAIN	1.049	1.00	1.012	1.00	1.046	1.00
VARCOST	1855.4	1692.4	1845.9	1776.4	1882.1	1703.8
STATE AID PER STUDENT	1511.7	2073.2	1534.8	1809.5	1558.2	2067.5
EXPENDITURE PER STUDENT	3297.4	2850.8	3259.8	3112.3	3255.6	2846.5
NONWHITE	26.50	57.14	26.22	46.89	32.14	57.54
SES	26.23	53.68	26.29	43.66	32.51	54.15
OBSERVATIONS	119	25	105	39	284	30

	Model IV		Model V		Model VI	
	G	NG	G	NG	G	NG
GAIN	1.016	1.00	1.050	1.00	1.026	1.00
VARCOST	1874.1	1810.9	1868.5	1723.9	1867.1	1743.4
STATE AID PER STUDENT	1569.6	1827.5	1542.7	2095.6	1541.3	2014.6
EXPENDITURE PER STUDENT	3224.0	3171.7	3229.7	2872.0	3232.5	2906.6
NONWHITE	31.98	50.08	34.96	68.09	34.76	64.35
SES	32.33	47.99	32.40	62.26	32.28	58.34
OBSERVATIONS	269	45	391	34	384	41

Direct and Indirect Distance Functions




Figure 1

APPENDIX B

Efficiency of the Texas Public School Delivery System

A Survey of Texas Economists

**EFFICIENCY OF THE TEXAS
PUBLIC SCHOOL DELIVERY SYSTEM**

By

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EFFICIENCY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL DELIVERY SYSTEM

"[I]t shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools." Texas Constitution Article 7 Section 1 (emphasis added)

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:

During the 1875 Constitutional debate, a major issue centered upon one of the basic economics questions raised earlier in that century: Will education "be best produced by monopoly or by competition?"¹ Historically, local governments in Texas had used privately run schools to provide education.² During the 1800's intellectual leaders were divided on the issue of how education could best and most efficiently be provided. One side, "public school" proponents, argued that a northern- style, government-controlled monopoly would produce greater efficiency due to economies of scale. Conversely, Voluntaryists, or free-traders, who supported the concept of privately controlled "free schools" contended that markets would produce greater efficiency and that a publicly controlled system would produce bureaucratic waste and inefficiency.³

At the time of the constitutional debate, neither side had empirical evidence to support their arguments. Nor did either side have sufficient votes to prevail over the other side. The final compromise, in drafting the Texas Constitution, combined the two terms and used the language "public free schools". The compromise also added the word "efficient".⁴ The intent appears to be allowing the market-driven system to compete with the public system to achieve efficiency. Some contend that neither system is specified in the Constitution.⁵ However, the final compromise, required that the system, in any event, be "efficient".

This study is intended to determine how economics experts view the issue of efficiency as it relates to the current educational delivery system in Texas.

¹ Eclectic Review, (July - December 1847)

² John Sharp, Forces of Change

³ Everhart, The Public School Monopoly

⁴ Allen Parker, "Public Free Schools", Southwestern Law Journal Vol.45, No. 2

⁵ Brief in Support of State Defendants' Special Exceptions and Motion for Summary Judgement, at 11

SUMMARY

A vast majority of economists who teach in Texas public and private universities and colleges believe that the current public school delivery system is "*not efficient*". Less than four percent of Texas economics professors consider the current educational delivery system to be clearly "*efficient*". Eighty-three percent of the economists surveyed believe that the current public delivery system for grades K through 12 is not efficient or not as efficient as it could be.

The survey also showed that Texas economists overwhelmingly agree that private service providers in general are more efficient than the government-run service providers that offer the same services. Only 3.7 percent of the economics professors surveyed think the government-run service providers were more efficient than private service providers.

An overwhelming majority of Texas economics professors consider that allowing consumers a choice in determining which service providers to use will enhance the efficiency of the system. The phrase heard most often in this survey was, "*With competition comes efficiency*." Most economists contend that a more competitive environment among our schools would bring better educational results for Texas school children. Eighty-three percent of those surveyed agree that a delivery system that allows consumers to choose between different providers would be more efficient than a system that does not provide for consumer choice. Only four percent think it would be less efficient.

Eighty-seven percent of all economists believe a delivery system that allows new providers to enter the market and that allows poor performing providers to fail, is more efficient. Less than three percent of those surveyed feel it would be less efficient.

Most economists surveyed think that our schools are not delivering the results needed in today's society. Only 2.8 percent of these professors felt that our children are learning enough to be well prepared for college. Less than six percent of those surveyed thought Texas public schools are doing a good job in providing "*a general diffusion of knowledge*" to Texas students.

In summation, in the opinion of these experts, *competition and market forces* are essential to get efficiency back into our school system and produce effective results for our students. Such restructuring will allow us to become more effective competitors with other states and the rest of the world.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The survey consisted of identifying and attempting to contact all economics professors who teach in Texas four-year private and public universities. Economists were selected for the survey since "efficiency" requires the allocation of resources to produce a desired output and "economics" is the analysis of the allocation of scarce resources. Therefore, economics professors were chosen since they are the most qualified, yet independent, experts to evaluate efficiency. Each four year institution was contacted and, a list of all economics professors was obtained. A total of 373

professors were identified as teaching economics at all Texas four-year institutions. Eventually, 233 professors or 62.5 percent of the total targeted group were interviewed. The economists were contacted by telephone a minimum of three times, from April 20, 1994 to May 4, 1994.

RESPONSES OF ECONOMISTS

There was no significant difference noted between the responses of professors among the Big Three public universities compared to the remaining public universities (see Table 3 and 4). The Big Three public universities include the University of Texas system, the Texas A&M system, and the University of Houston system. Although responses were very similar between public and private universities, on most questions there was a five to twelve point spread, in favor of markets, between private and public universities (see Table 2 and 3). This difference was offset by about an eight percent increase in "no response" by professors in the publically funded universities.

FINDINGS OF SURVEY

Less than three percent of those surveyed thought Texas high school graduates were *well prepared for college*. Only 1.3 percent of professors from the public universities felt students were well prepared for college. Several economists also expressed the concern that many of the students cannot spell, read proficiently, or perform simple math skills. While there are always exceptional students to be found in a school system, most professors surveyed believed that more than half of the students were not well prepared for college. Two-thirds of the survey participants expressed views that student preparedness varied a lot from school to school and from school district to school district. Some students graduate from high school being well prepared for college while others graduate being far from adequately prepared.

A majority (62 percent) agreed that in general, public-run service providers are *not* as efficient as the private service providers that offer the same services. Only 3.7 percent thought that government-run providers were more efficient. The majority, 83 percent, of the Texas economics professors agreed that a delivery system would be more efficient if consumers were given a *choice* among alternative providers. A majority of economists, 87 percent, believe that allowing *poor providers to fail and allowing new providers to enter* the market would create more efficiency. Many professors volunteered that in their opinion the state's primary emphasis should be on improvement in our schools.

Although the Texas Constitution requires that the educational system provide for a "*general diffusion of knowledge*", 83 percent of the professors think that the current educational system is only providing a fair or poor "general diffusion of knowledge" to Texas school children. Many economists attributed this problem to a system that has a lot of paperwork and bureaucracy and cannot concentrate on academics. Several economists noted that teachers are doing a good job with what they have to work with. Many of the economists indicated that there are "too many administrators administrating" in the system. Too much money is going toward administrative costs

and not enough going into actual educational costs. Many believe that with the larger school districts, there were more inefficiencies as well as disparities in results. Most attributed the inefficiencies to the system, not the people in the system.

CONCLUSION

Texas economists *do not* consider the current educational delivery system to be "efficient". Only 3.7 percent view the system as efficient. The overwhelming majority, 83 percent, consider the system to be either not efficient or somewhat short of being efficient. In the view of Texas economists, the decisions we have made regarding our educational system, are clearly *not efficient*. Although our "public free school" system makes virtually exclusive use of public providers, and excludes private providers, very few economists believe this is efficient. Although, Texas consumers, for the most part, are not allowed to choose the schools their children will attend - the overwhelming majority of these experts believe it would be more efficient to allow consumer choice. In practice, new providers are not allowed to enter the market, nor or poor performing providers removed. Only 2 out of 100 economists believe this is efficient.

We must conclude from these findings that Texas economics professors overwhelmingly agree with the contentions of the "free-schoolers" of 1875. Just as feared during the Constitutional debate of 1875, a publicly controlled education system does produce unavoidable waste and inefficiency. An efficient educational delivery system will require the injection of competition and market forces to assure the allocation of scarce resources in an effective manner to maximize educational results.

"The whole world is being swept by a realization that markets have tremendous advantages over central control and bureaucracy."⁶


Texas economists overwhelmingly agree!

⁶ Chubb and Moe, School Reform in Great Britain

Question # 1

SURVEY OF TEXAS ECONOMISTS

Efficiency of Public vs. Private Providers




"As an economist, would you say that government-run service providers are more more efficient, less efficient, or about the same as privately-run service providers who who offer the same services ?"

	ALL	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	BIG 3	OTHER
MORE	3.7%	1.7%	4.5%	2.8%	8.7%
LESS	62.1%	71.2%	58.7%	63.3%	47.8%
SAME	17.8%	16.9%	18.1%	14.7%	26.1%
NO RESPONSE /DON'T KNOW	16.4%	10.2%	18.7%	19.3%	17.4%

Question # 2

SURVEY OF TEXAS ECONOMISTS

Efficiency of Consumer Choice




"Would you say a delivery system which allows consumers to choose between different providers is normally more efficient, less efficient, or about the same as a system which allows no choice of providers ?"

	ALL	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	BIG 3	OTHER
MORE	82.7%	89.8%	80.0%	80.7%	78.3%
LESS	4.2%	3.4%	4.5%	4.6%	4.3%
SAME	3.7%	3.4%	3.9%	2.8%	6.5%
NO RESPONSE /DON'T KNOW	9.3%	3.4%	11.6%	11.9%	10.9%

Question # 3

SURVEY OF TEXAS ECONOMISTS

Efficiency of Free Entry / Exit




"Would you say a delivery system which allows new providers to enter the market, and allows poor performing providers to fail, is; more efficient, less efficient, or about the same as a system where the number of providers does not change ?"

	ALL	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	BIG 3	OTHER
MORE	86.9%	94.9%	83.9%	84.4%	82.6%
LESS	2.3%	1.7%	2.6%	1.8%	4.3%
SAME	1.9%	0.0%	2.6%	0.9%	6.5%
NO RESPONSE /DON'T KNOW	8.9%	3.4%	10.9%	12.8%	6.5%

Question # 4

SURVEY OF TEXAS ECONOMISTS

Preperation for College




"As a college professor, would you say that Texas High school graduates are well prepared for college, not well prepared, or that it varies a lot ?"

	ALL	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	BIG 3	OTHER
WELL	2.8%	6.8%	1.3%	1.8%	0.0%
NOT WELL	28.5%	16.9%	32.9%	35.8%	26.1%
VARIES A LOT	65.9%	73.0%	63.2%	59.6%	71.8%
NO RESPONSE /DON'T KNOW	2.8%	3.4%	2.6%	2.8%	2.2%

Question # 5

SURVEY OF TEXAS ECONOMISTS

General Diffusion of Knowledge




"Would you say that Texas Public Schools are doing a good job, a fair job, or a poor job in providing a general diffusion of knowledge to Texas students ?"

	ALL	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	BIG 3	OTHER
GOOD	5.6%	5.1%	5.8%	3.7%	10.9%
FAIR	54.7%	57.6%	53.5%	50.5%	60.9%
POOR	28.0%	25.4%	29.0%	32.1%	21.7%
NO RESPONSE /DON'T KNOW	11.7%	11.9%	11.6%	13.8%	6.5%

Question # 6

SURVEY OF TEXAS ECONOMISTS

"EFFICIENT SYSTEM"



"As an economist, would you say that the current institutional delivery system for grades K through 12 is efficient, or not efficient in providing educational results ?"

	ALL	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	BIG 3	OTHER
EFFICIENT	3.7%	5.1%	3.2%	3.7%	2.2%
NOT EFFICIENT	68.7%	71.2%	67.7%	67.9%	67.4%
NOT AS EFFICIENT (VOLUNTEERED)	14.0%	16.9%	12.9%	11.9%	15.2%
NO RESPONSE /DON'T KNOW	13.6%	6.8%	16.1%	16.5%	15.2%

TABLE 1:
SURVEY RESULTS - ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES

(214 RESPONSES OUT OF 373)

QUESTION 1: "AS AN ECONOMIST, WOULD YOU SAY THAT GOVERNMENT-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS PRIVATELY-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS WHO OFFER THE SAME SERVICES?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
3.7%	17.8%	62.1%	16.4%

QUESTION 2: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS CONSUMERS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROVIDERS IS NORMALLY MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NO CHOICE OF PROVIDERS?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
82.7%	3.7%	4.2%	9.3%

QUESTION 3: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NEW PROVIDERS TO ENTER THE MARKET, AND ALLOWS POOR PERFORMING PROVIDERS TO FAIL, IS; MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHERE NUMBER OF PROVIDERS DOES NOT CHANGE?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
86.9%	1.9%	2.3%	8.9%

QUESTION 4: "AS A COLLEGE PROFESSOR, WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ARE WELL PREPARED FOR COLLEGE, NOT WELL PREPARED, OR THAT IT VARIES A LOT?"

<u>WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>VARIES A LOT</u>	<u>NOT WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
2.8%	65.9%	28.5%	2.8%

QUESTION 5: "WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE DOING A GOOD JOB, A FAIR JOB, OR A POOR JOB IN PROVIDING A GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE TO TEXAS STUDENTS?"

<u>GOOD JOB</u>	<u>FAIR JOB</u>	<u>POOR JOB</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
5.6%	54.7%	28.0%	11.7%

QUESTION 6: "AS AN ECONOMIST, OVERALL, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR GRADES K THROUGH 12 IS EFFICIENT, OR NOT EFFICIENT IN PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL RESULTS?"

<u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>NOT AS EFFICIENT AS IT COULD BE (VOLUNTEERED)</u>	<u>NOT EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
3.7%	14.0%	68.7%	13.6%

TABLE 2: SURVEY RESULTS FOR PRIVATE COLLEGES

(59 RESPONSES)

QUESTION 1: "AS AN ECONOMIST, WOULD YOU SAY THAT GOVERNMENT-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS PRIVATELY-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS WHO OFFER THE SAME SERVICES?"

<u>MORE</u> <u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE</u> <u>SAME</u>	<u>LESS</u> <u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T</u> <u>KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
1.7%	16.9%	71.2%	10.2%

QUESTION 2: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS CONSUMERS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROVIDERS IS NORMALLY MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NO CHOICE OF PROVIDERS?"

<u>MORE</u> <u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE</u> <u>SAME</u>	<u>LESS</u> <u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T</u> <u>KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
89.8%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%

QUESTION 3: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NEW PROVIDERS TO ENTER THE MARKET, AND ALLOWS POOR PERFORMING PROVIDERS TO FAIL, IS; MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHERE NUMBER OF PROVIDERS DOES NOT CHANGE?"

<u>MORE</u> <u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE</u> <u>SAME</u>	<u>LESS</u> <u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T</u> <u>KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
94.9%	0.0%	1.7%	3.4%

QUESTION 4: "AS A COLLEGE PROFESSOR, WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ARE WELL PREPARED FOR COLLEGE, NOT WELL PREPARED, OR THAT IT VARIES A LOT?"

<u>WELL</u> <u>PREPARED</u>	<u>VARIES</u> <u>A LOT</u>	<u>NOT WELL</u> <u>PREPARED</u>	<u>DON'T</u> <u>KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
6.8%	73.0%	16.9%	3.4%

QUESTION 5: "WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE DOING A GOOD JOB, A FAIR JOB, OR A POOR JOB IN PROVIDING A GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE TO TEXAS STUDENTS?"

<u>GOOD JOB</u>	<u>FAIR JOB</u>	<u>POOR JOB</u>	<u>DON'T</u> <u>KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
5.1%	57.6%	25.4%	11.9%

QUESTION 6: "AS AN ECONOMIST, OVERALL, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR GRADES K THROUGH 12 IS EFFICIENT, OR NOT EFFICIENT IN PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL RESULTS?"

<u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>NOT AS EFFICIENT</u> <u>AS IT COULD BE</u> <u>(VOLUNTEERED)</u>	<u>NOT</u> <u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T</u> <u>KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
5.1%	16.9%	71.2%	6.8%

TABLE 3: SURVEY RESULTS FOR ALL PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES

(155 RESPONSES)

QUESTION 1: "AS AN ECONOMIST, WOULD YOU SAY THAT GOVERNMENT-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS PRIVATELY-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS WHO OFFER THE SAME SERVICES?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
4.5%	18.1%	58.7%	18.7%

QUESTION 2: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS CONSUMERS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROVIDERS IS NORMALLY MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NO CHOICE OF PROVIDERS?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
80.0%	3.9%	4.5%	11.6%

QUESTION 3: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NEW PROVIDERS TO ENTER THE MARKET, AND ALLOWS POOR PERFORMING PROVIDERS TO FAIL, IS; MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHERE NUMBER OF PROVIDERS DOES NOT CHANGE?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
83.9%	2.6%	2.6%	10.9%

QUESTION 4: "AS A COLLEGE PROFESSOR, WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ARE WELL PREPARED FOR COLLEGE, NOT WELL PREPARED, OR THAT IT VARIES A LOT?"

<u>WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>VARIES A LOT</u>	<u>NOT WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
1.3%	63.2%	32.9%	2.6%

QUESTION 5: "WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE DOING A GOOD JOB, A FAIR JOB, OR A POOR JOB IN PROVIDING A GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE TO TEXAS STUDENTS?"

<u>GOOD JOB</u>	<u>FAIR JOB</u>	<u>POOR JOB</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
5.8%	53.5%	29.0%	11.6%

QUESTION 6: "AS AN ECONOMIST, OVERALL, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR GRADES K THROUGH 12 IS EFFICIENT, OR NOT EFFICIENT IN PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL RESULTS?"

<u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>NOT AS EFFICIENT AS IT COULD BE (VOLUNTEERED)</u>	<u>NOT EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
3.2%	12.9%	67.7%	16.1%

TABLE 4: SURVEY RESULTS FOR BIG THREE PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES

(109 RESPONSES)

QUESTION 1: "AS AN ECONOMIST, WOULD YOU SAY THAT GOVERNMENT-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS PRIVATELY-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS WHO OFFER THE SAME SERVICES?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
2.8%	14.7%	63.3%	19.3%

QUESTION 2: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS CONSUMERS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROVIDERS IS NORMALLY MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NO CHOICE OF PROVIDERS?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
80.7%	2.8%	4.6%	11.9%

QUESTION 3: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NEW PROVIDERS TO ENTER THE MARKET, AND ALLOWS POOR PERFORMING PROVIDERS TO FAIL, IS; MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHERE NUMBER OF PROVIDERS DOES NOT CHANGE?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
84.4%	0.9%	1.8%	12.8%

QUESTION 4: "AS A COLLEGE PROFESSOR, WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ARE WELL PREPARED FOR COLLEGE, NOT WELL PREPARED, OR THAT IT VARIES A LOT?"

<u>WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>VARIES A LOT</u>	<u>NOT WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
1.8%	59.6%	35.8%	2.8%

QUESTION 5: "WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE DOING A GOOD JOB, A FAIR JOB, OR A POOR JOB IN PROVIDING A GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE TO TEXAS STUDENTS?"

<u>GOOD JOB</u>	<u>FAIR JOB</u>	<u>POOR JOB</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
3.7%	50.5%	32.1%	13.8%

QUESTION 6: "AS AN ECONOMIST, OVERALL, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR GRADES K THROUGH 12 IS EFFICIENT, OR NOT EFFICIENT IN PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL RESULTS?"

<u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>NOT AS EFFICIENT AS IT COULD BE (VOLUNTEERED)</u>	<u>NOT EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
3.7%	11.9%	67.9%	16.5%

**TABLE 5: SURVEY RESULTS FOR PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE BIG THREE**

(46 RESPONSES)

QUESTION 1: "AS AN ECONOMIST, WOULD YOU SAY THAT GOVERNMENT-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS PRIVATELY-RUN SERVICE PROVIDERS WHO OFFER THE SAME SERVICES?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
8.7%	26.1%	47.8%	17.4%

QUESTION 2: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS CONSUMERS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROVIDERS IS NORMALLY MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NO CHOICE OF PROVIDERS?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
78.3%	6.5%	4.3%	10.9%

QUESTION 3: "WOULD YOU SAY A DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS NEW PROVIDERS TO ENTER THE MARKET, AND ALLOWS POOR PERFORMING PROVIDERS TO FAIL, IS; MORE EFFICIENT, LESS EFFICIENT, OR ABOUT THE SAME AS A SYSTEM WHERE NUMBER OF PROVIDERS DOES NOT CHANGE?"

<u>MORE EFFICIENT</u>	<u>ABOUT THE SAME</u>	<u>LESS EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
82.6%	6.5%	4.3%	6.5%

QUESTION 4: "AS A COLLEGE PROFESSOR, WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ARE WELL PREPARED FOR COLLEGE, NOT WELL PREPARED, OR THAT IT VARIES A LOT?"

<u>WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>VARIES A LOT</u>	<u>NOT WELL PREPARED</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
0.0%	71.8%	26.1%	2.2%

QUESTION 5: "WOULD YOU SAY THAT TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE DOING A GOOD JOB, A FAIR JOB, OR A POOR JOB IN PROVIDING A GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE TO TEXAS STUDENTS?"

<u>GOOD JOB</u>	<u>FAIR JOB</u>	<u>POOR JOB</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
10.9%	60.9%	21.7%	6.5%

QUESTION 6: "AS AN ECONOMIST, OVERALL, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR GRADES K THROUGH 12 IS EFFICIENT, OR NOT EFFICIENT IN PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL RESULTS?"

<u>EFFICIENT</u>	<u>NOT AS EFFICIENT AS IT COULD BE (VOLUNTEERED)</u>	<u>NOT EFFICIENT</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW. (OTHER)</u>
2.2%	15.2%	67.4%	15.2%

APPENDIX C

Houston and Dallas

TAAS Results

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT DATA USING TAAS SCORES BY CAMPUS FOR SPRING 93
PERCENT FAILING TAAS TESTS FOR SCHOOLS IN DALLAS AND HOUSTON ISDS
NUMBER FAILING/NUMBER OF STUDENTS TESTED - RUN #1
(LBBS.GENERIC.GRUSNDRF(STDACHV))

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	CAMPUS NUMBER	CAMPUS NAME	GRADE TESTED	PERCENT FAILING	NUMBER TESTED
1	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905024	NORTH DALLAS H	10	57.75	284
2	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905099	HOSPITAL/HOME-B	10	50.00	16
3	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905020	COMPREHENSIVE E	10	48.39	31
4	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905032	MADISON H S	10	47.06	102
5	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905003	A MACEO SMITH H	10	46.77	201
6	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905017	SPRUCE H S	10	41.58	291
7	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905002	ADAMSON H S	10	39.80	299
8	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905008	KIMBALL H S	10	38.83	273
9	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905014	W W SAMUELL H S	10	38.46	234
10	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905013	ROOSEVELT H S	10	37.35	166
11	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905018	SUNSET H S	10	35.36	444
12	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905022	WILSON H S	10	32.44	262
13	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905012	PINKSTON H S	10	31.67	120
14	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905016	SOUTH OAK CLIFF	10	29.48	251
15	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905009	LINCOLN H S	10	29.04	272
16	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905007	JEFFERSON H S	10	26.98	215
17	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905023	CARTER H S	10	24.25	367
18	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905006	HILLCREST H S	10	22.17	230
19	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905021	WHITE H S	10	20.63	286
20	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905015	SEAGOVILLE H S	10	18.18	143
21	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905001	ADAMS H S	10	16.72	329
22	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905025	SKYLINE H S	10	16.41	786
23	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905090	MIDDLE COLLEGE	10	16.13	31
24	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905036	HEALTH PROFESSI	10	10.63	160
25	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905037	EDUC & SOCIAL S	10	8.70	23
26	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905033	BUSINESS & MGMT	10	8.23	231
27	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905038	MAG CTR-PUB SER	10	6.02	83
28	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905034	ARTS MAGNET H S	10	4.52	177
29	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905039	TAG MAGNET	10	0.00	31
30	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905060	STOREY MIDDLE	08	59.09	242
31	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905072	ZUMWALT MIDDLE	08	53.31	332
32	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905099	HOSPITAL/HOME-B	08	50.00	28
33	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905045	COMSTOCK MIDDLE	08	48.42	349
34	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905051	HOLMES MIDDLE	08	47.31	484
35	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905052	HOOD MIDDLE	08	46.85	286
36	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905055	RUSK MIDDLE	08	43.67	158
37	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905053	LONG MIDDLE	08	43.18	352
38	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905074	EDISON LEARNING	08	42.65	279
39	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905043	BROWNE MIDDLE	08	42.00	419
40	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905065	ANDERSON MIDDLE	08	41.72	441
41	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905049	GREINER MIDDLE	08	41.07	806
42	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905059	STOCKARD MIDDLE	08	40.17	351
43	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905046	FLORENCE MIDDLE	08	38.67	375
44	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905069	SEAGOVILLE MIDU	08	36.09	266
45	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905048	GASTON MIDDLE	08	33.67	300
46	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905047	FRANKLIN MIDDLE	08	30.34	267
47	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905063	HULCY MIDDLE	08	28.71	310
48	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905058	SPENCE MIDDLE	08	28.46	246

. =LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	CAMPUS NUMBER	CAMPUS NAME	GRADE TESTED	PERCENT FAILING	NUMBER TESTED
49	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905050	HILL MIDDLE	08	26.29	232
50	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905054	THOMAS C MARSH	08	26.04	265
51	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905044	CARY MIDDLE	08	22.79	272
52	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905042	ATWELL MIDDLE	08	13.10	435
53	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905159	HOTCHKISS MONTE	08	8.06	62
54	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905071	EDISON ENVIRONM	08	5.95	84
55	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905073	LONGFELLOW MIDD	08	1.74	172
56	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905157	HOGG EL	04	58.23	79
57	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905130	COWART EL	04	56.58	152
58	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905150	HARLEE EL	04	53.85	26
59	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905189	OLIVER EL	04	52.17	69
60	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905185	MILLER EL	04	50.00	60
61	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905139	PAUL DUNBAR EL	04	47.95	73
62	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905267	DANIEL JAMES LE	04	47.83	138
63	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905207	SAN JACINTO EL	04	46.27	67
64	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905114	BRYAN EL	04	45.63	103
65	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905216	TITCHER EL	04	43.71	167
66	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905204	ROSEMONT EL	04	43.40	106
67	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905163	JOHNSTON EL	04	43.06	72
68	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905109	BLAIR EL	04	42.86	77
69	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905217	TRAVIS EL	04	42.86	70
70	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905132	DARRELL EL	04	41.67	60
71	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905175	LEE U EL	04	41.18	68
72	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905112	BOWIE EL	04	40.74	54
73	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905136	DONALD EL	04	40.37	109
74	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905115	BUDD EL	04	40.19	107
75	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905197	REAGAN EL	04	39.05	105
76	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905105	ARCADIA PARK EL	04	38.36	73
77	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905117	BURLESON EL	04	37.82	119
78	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905211	STEVENS PARK EL	04	37.65	85
79	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905133	DAVIS EL	04	37.59	133
80	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905124	CARVER EL	04	36.99	73
81	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905192	PEELER EL	04	36.90	84
82	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905264	MCNAIR EL	04	36.89	103
83	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905186	MILLS EL	04	36.84	95
84	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905116	BURNET EL	04	36.75	117
85	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905140	EARHART EL	04	36.54	52
86	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905170	LAGOW EL	04	36.49	74
87	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905210	STEMMONS EL	04	36.27	102
88	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905181	MAPLE LAWN EL	04	36.25	80
89	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905190	PEABODY EL	04	36.14	83
90	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905149	HALL EL	04	35.00	80
91	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905184	MILAM EL	04	35.00	40
92	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905250	YOUNG EL	04	34.62	52
93	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905237	RUNYON EL	04	34.48	116
94	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905177	LIPSCOMB EL	04	34.07	91
95	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905106	ARLINGTON PARK	04	33.33	15
96	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905164	JONES EL	04	33.33	96

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97	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905262	SEQUOYAH EL	04	32.00	100
98	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905128	COLONIAL EL	04	31.75	63
99	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905213	TERRY EL	04	31.46	89
100	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905110	BLANTON EL	04	30.39	102
101	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905251	M JACKSON FL	04	30.23	172
102	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905263	STARKS EL	04	30.19	53
103	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905129	CONNER EL	04	28.95	76
104	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905152	HENDERSON CL	04	28.93	121
105	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905265	ELADIO MARTINEZ	04	28.76	153
106	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905137	DORSEY EL	04	28.57	84
107	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905182	MARCUS EL	04	28.57	63
108	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905104	WILLIAM ANDERSO	04	28.43	102
109	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905201	RICE EL	04	28.30	106
110	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905187	MOSELEY EL	04	28.07	57
111	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905220	TWAIN EL	04	27.93	111
112	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905173	LANIER EL	04	27.82	133
113	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905131	IGNACIO ZARAGOS	04	27.27	55
114	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905230	WITHERS EL	04	27.18	103
115	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905101	J Q ADAMS EL	04	26.02	123
116	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905126	CENTRAL EL	04	25.00	172
117	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905212	HARRY STONE MON	04	25.00	60
118	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905215	THORNTON EL	04	24.72	89
119	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905159	HOTCHKISS MONTE	04	24.59	61
120	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905145	FOSTER EL	04	24.53	53
121	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905202	ROBERTS EL	04	24.24	33
122	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905225	WEBSTER EL	04	24.00	125
123	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905256	J LESLIE PATTON	04	23.64	55
124	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905180	MACON EL	04	23.60	89
125	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905214	THOMPSON EL	04	23.48	132
126	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905171	LAKEWOOD EL	04	23.26	129
127	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905195	PRESTON HOLLOW	04	22.89	83
128	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905188	MOUNT AUBURN EL	04	21.74	69
129	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905161	IRELAND EL	04	21.59	88
130	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905218	TRUETT EL	04	20.39	103
131	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905232	ROWE EL	04	20.22	89
132	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905194	POLK EL	04	20.21	94
133	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905178	LISBON EL	04	19.64	56
134	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905236	COCHRAN EL	04	19.40	67
135	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905199	REINHARDT EL	04	17.44	86
136	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905158	HOOE EL	04	17.42	132
137	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905167	KLEBERG EL	04	17.28	81
138	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905228	WILLIAMS EL	04	17.24	29
139	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905226	WEISS EL	04	17.07	41
140	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905168	KNIGHT EL	04	16.95	59
141	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905156	HAWTHORNE EL	04	16.67	54
142	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905120	CAILLET EL	04	16.33	49
143	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905206	SANGER EL	04	15.79	57
144	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905147	GILL EL	04	15.66	83

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145	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905219	TURNER EL	04	15.09	106
146	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905125	CASA VIEW EL	04	14.86	74
147	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905198	REILLY EL	04	14.67	75
148	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905108	BAYLES EL	04	14.55	55
149	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905222	URBAN PARK EL	04	13.04	92
150	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905148	GOOCH EL	04	12.77	47
151	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905203	ROGERS EL	04	12.31	65
152	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905229	WINNETKA EL	04	12.09	91
153	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905183	MARSALIS EL	04	11.86	59
154	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905121	CARPENTER EL	04	11.76	68
155	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905205	RUSSELL EL	04	11.54	104
156	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905235	ALEXANDER EL	04	10.94	64
157	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905193	PERSHING EL	04	10.77	65
158	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905209	SILBERSTEIN EL	04	10.71	56
159	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905169	KRAMER EL	04	10.08	119
160	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905144	FIELD EL	04	10.00	20
161	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905224	WALNUT HILL EL	04	7.50	40
162	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905127	CITY PARK EL	04	7.14	14
163	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905174	LEE R E EL	04	6.98	43
164	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905118	BUSHMAN EL	04	6.41	78
165	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905200	RHOADS EL	04	5.68	88
166	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905153	HEXTER EL	04	4.48	67
167	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905233	NATHAN ADAMS EL	04	4.35	46
168	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905119	CABELL EL	04	3.77	53
169	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905113	BROWN EL	04	2.86	35
170	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905142	J N ERVIN EL	04	2.82	71
171	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905166	KIEST EL	04	1.30	77
172	057905	DALLAS ISD	057905162	STONEWALL JACKS	04	0.00	44
173	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912031	HARRIS CO YOUTH	10	83.33	6
174	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912028	SANCHEZ JR SR	10	77.14	35
175	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912038	H P CARTER	10	62.86	35
176	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912030	ON-GOING EDUCAT	10	54.55	33
177	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912013	COMMUNITY SERVI	10	53.13	32
178	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912018	WHEATLEY H S	10	49.21	191
179	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912029	CONTEMPORARY LR	10	47.22	108
180	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912009	LEE H S	10	45.22	502
181	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912001	AUSTIN H S	10	40.90	599
182	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912019	WORTHING H S	10	38.89	198
183	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912032	NIGHT H S	10	38.46	13
184	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912004	FURR H S	10	37.76	286
185	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912005	SAM HOUSTON H S	10	37.05	475
186	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912006	JONES H S	10	35.78	232
187	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912007	KASHMERE H S	10	32.05	156
188	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912003	DAVIS H S	10	31.33	316
189	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912010	MADISON H S	10	30.20	351
190	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912012	REAGAN H S	10	29.60	321
191	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912020	YATES H S	10	28.61	339
192	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912021	CRITTENTON CENT	10	28.57	14

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193	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912015	WALTRIP H S	10	24.03	283
194	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912011	MILBY H S	10	23.11	714
195	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912014	STERLING H S	10	22.01	268
196	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912023	SHARPSTOWN H S	10	22.01	309
197	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912024	SCARBOROUGH H S	10	20.20	198
198	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912016	WASHINGTON B T	10	19.50	318
199	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912017	WESTBURY H S	10	18.96	443
200	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912002	BELLAIRE H S	10	14.80	662
201	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912008	LAMAR H S	10	13.03	476
202	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912033	BARBARA JORDAN	10	10.89	202
203	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912022	FOLEY'S ACADEMY	10	5.41	37
204	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912025	PERFOR & VIS AR	10	0.63	159
205	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912034	LAW ENFCMT-CRIM	10	0.55	182
206	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912026	HEALTH PROFESSI	10	0.00	192
207	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912073	TENELL ALTERNAT	08	88.37	43
208	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912021	CRITTENTON CENT	08	85.71	7
209	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912030	ON-GOING EDUCAT	08	78.26	23
210	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912093	CONTEMP LRNG CT	08	77.50	80
211	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912013	COMMUNITY SERVI	08	76.92	26
212	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912288	COMMUNITY SERVI	08	76.19	21
213	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912041	ATTUCKS MIDDLE	08	67.77	242
214	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912067	SMITH E O MIDDLE	08	64.58	96
215	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912031	HARRIS CO YOUTH	08	63.16	38
216	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912062	MCREYNOLDS MIDD	08	60.89	225
217	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912044	CULLEN MIDDLE	08	60.35	227
218	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912082	M C WILLIAMS MI	08	58.08	198
219	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912075	DOWLING MIDDLE	08	57.75	284
220	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912059	LONG MIDDLE	08	57.31	349
221	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912079	KEY MIDDLE	08	57.08	219
222	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912054	JACKSON MIDDLE	08	55.28	369
223	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912035	BURNETT-BAYLAND	08	53.85	13
224	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912046	EDISON MIDDLE	08	52.65	302
225	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912077	THOMAS MIDDLE	08	50.25	197
226	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912061	MARSHALL MIDDLE	08	49.06	267
227	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912043	BURBANK MIDDLE	08	48.35	333
228	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912074	WOODSON MIDDLE	08	48.15	189
229	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912047	FONVILLE MIDDLE	08	47.77	224
230	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912045	DEADY MIDDLE	08	47.75	645
231	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912078	FLEMING MIDDLE	08	43.67	332
232	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912052	PATRICK HENRY M	08	43.42	281
233	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912051	HARTMAN MIDDLE	08	42.96	405
234	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912058	GREGORY-LINCOLN	08	42.68	164
235	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912042	BLACK MIDDLE	08	42.04	245
236	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912050	HOLLAND MIDDLE	08	39.66	290
237	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912072	FONDREN MIDDLE	08	36.98	311
238	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912081	SHARPSTOWN MIDD	08	34.24	330
239	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912053	HOGG MIDDLE	08	33.48	221
240	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912049	HAMILTON MIDDLE	08	31.23	349

. =LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT DATA USING TAAS SCORES BY CAMPUS FOR SPRING 93
PERCENT FAILING TAAS TESTS FOR SCHOOLS IN DALLAS AND HOUSTON ISDs
NUMBER FAILING/NUMBER OF STUDENTS TESTED - RUN #1
(LBBS.GENERIC.GRUSNDRF(STUACHV))

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	CAMPUS NUMBER	CAMPUS NAME	GRADE TESTED	PERCENT FAILING	NUMBER TESTED
241	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912066	RYAN MIDDLE	08	30.51	272
242	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912060	REVERE MIDDLE	08	28.89	443
243	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912064	PERSHING MIDDLE	08	19.91	457
244	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912048	CLIFTON MIDDLE	08	18.92	444
245	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912056	WELCH MIDDLE	08	16.90	420
246	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912055	JOHNSTON MIDDLE	08	15.81	468
247	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912057	LANIER MIDDLE	08	5.05	416
248	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912039	T H ROGERS SECO	08	0.00	94
249	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912156	FROST EL	04	64.37	87
250	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912288	COMMUNITY SERVI	04	60.00	10
251	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912147	ELIOT EL	04	57.32	82
252	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912282	GREGORY-LINCOLN	04	57.14	42
253	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912150	FAIRCHILD EL	04	53.33	60
254	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912193	LEE EL	04	48.57	35
255	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912108	BASTIAN EL	04	45.07	71
256	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912222	PORT HOUSTON EL	04	44.12	34
257	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912291	GALLEGOS	04	43.86	57
258	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912140	DOGAN EL	04	42.55	47
259	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912134	CRAWFORD EL	04	42.31	26
260	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912281	SANCHEZ EL	04	42.20	173
261	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912287	CAGE EL	04	40.00	85
262	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912210	NORTHLINE EL	04	39.76	83
263	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912146	EIGHTH AVE EL	04	39.13	23
264	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912160	GORDON EL	04	38.46	52
265	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912283	GARCIA	04	38.46	65
266	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912176	HOHL EL	04	36.11	72
267	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912226	RHOADS EL	04	36.11	72
268	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912266	E.O. SMITH EL	04	35.29	34
269	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912148	ELROD EL	04	35.09	114
270	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912179	HOUSTON GARDENS	04	35.00	60
271	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912297	DAVILA EL	04	34.88	43
272	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912235	RYAN EL	04	33.96	53
273	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912225	REYNOLDS EL	04	33.87	62
274	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912217	PECK EL	04	33.33	45
275	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912194	LEWIS EL	04	32.73	110
276	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912219	PINEY POINT EL	04	32.14	56
277	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912247	SUNNY SIDE EL	04	31.82	44
278	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912154	FOSTER EL	04	31.76	85
279	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912260	WINDSOR VILLAGE	04	31.53	111
280	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912184	JONES J WILL EL	04	31.03	58
281	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912171	HENDERSON J EL	04	30.43	46
282	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912168	HARTSFIELD EL	04	30.00	40
283	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912153	FONDREN EL	04	29.79	47
284	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912202	MCDADE EL	04	29.49	78
285	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912120	BROWNING EL	04	29.09	55
286	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912181	JANOWSKI EL	04	28.33	60
287	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912138	DEZAVALA EL	04	28.13	64
288	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912290	CRESPO	04	27.66	47

. = LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT DATA USING TAAS SCORES BY CAMPUS FOR SPRING 93
PERCENT FAILING TAAS TESTS FOR SCHOOLS IN DALLAS AND HOUSTON ISDS
NUMBER FAILING/NUMBER OF STUDENTS TESTED - RUN #1
(LBBS.GENERIC.GRUSDORF(STUACHV))

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	CAMPUS NUMBER	CAMPUS NAME	GRADE TESTED	PERCENT FAILING	NUMBER TESTED
289	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912262	GRISCOM EL	04	27.61	134
290	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912174	HIGHLAND HTS EL	04	27.50	40
291	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912127	CARNEGIE EL	04	27.45	51
292	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912185	KASHMERE GARDEN	04	27.27	55
293	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912292	CARRILLO	04	27.27	33
294	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912205	MILAM EL	04	26.67	30
295	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912106	ATHERTON EL	04	26.32	57
296	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912239	SHEARN EL	04	26.32	19
297	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912187	KELSO EL	04	25.93	81
298	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912298	MARTINEZ	04	25.81	62
299	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912122	BURBANK EL	04	25.68	74
300	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912155	FRANKLIN EL	04	25.58	86
301	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912218	PILGRIM EL	04	25.49	51
302	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912279	TIJERINA EL	04	25.40	63
303	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912265	PETERSEN EL	04	25.35	71
304	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912159	GOLFCREST EL	04	25.22	115
305	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912110	BLACKSHEAR EL	04	25.00	72
306	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912145	EASTER EL	04	25.00	36
307	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912271	FOERSTER EL	04	25.00	100
308	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912111	BONHAM EL	04	24.63	134
309	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912209	NEFF EL	04	24.62	65
310	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912236	SANDERSON EL	04	23.91	46
311	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912295	BENAVIDEZ	04	23.86	88
312	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912144	DURKEE EL	04	23.60	89
313	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912177	HOLDEN EL	04	23.53	34
314	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912234	RUSK EL	04	23.33	30
315	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912119	BROOKLINE EL	04	23.30	103
316	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912197	LOOSCAN EL	04	22.86	70
317	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912270	CONCORD EL	04	22.58	31
318	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912299	A A MILNE EL	04	22.32	112
319	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912241	SINCLAIR EL	04	22.22	81
320	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912137	DECHAUMES EL	04	21.82	55
321	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912216	PATTERSON EL	04	21.52	79
322	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912125	BURRUS EL	04	21.25	80
323	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912105	ANDERSON EL	04	21.15	104
324	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912245	STEVENS EL	04	20.88	91
325	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912102	ALCOTT EL	04	20.55	73
326	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912149	EMERSON EL	04	20.00	40
327	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912167	HARRIS R P EL	04	20.00	90
328	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912259	WILSON EL	04	19.64	56
329	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912114	BRAEBURN EL	04	19.35	62
330	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912263	LAW EL	04	19.23	52
331	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912272	MACARTHUR EL	04	19.15	47
332	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912243	THOMPSON EL	04	19.05	63
333	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912112	BONNER EL	04	18.92	37
334	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912258	WHITTIER EL	04	18.92	74
335	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912192	LANTRIP EL	04	18.84	69
336	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912183	JONES ANSON EL	04	18.75	48

.,=LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	CAMPUS NUMBER	CAMPUS NAME	GRADE TESTED	PERCENT FAILING	NUMBER TESTED
337	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912141	DOUGLASS EL	04	18.18	44
338	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912158	GARDEN VILLAS E	04	18.18	110
339	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912195	LOCKHART EL	04	18.18	77
340	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912232	ROSS EL	04	18.06	72
341	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912190	LAMAR EL	04	17.95	39
342	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912128	LYONE ELEMENTAR	04	17.65	68
343	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912169	HARVARD EL	04	17.24	87
344	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912103	ALLEN EL	04	17.07	41
345	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912269	SCROGGINS EL	04	16.36	55
346	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912109	BERRY EL	04	16.13	62
347	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912213	OSBORNE EL	04	16.13	62
348	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912123	CODWELL EL	04	16.07	56
349	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912170	HELMS EL	04	15.38	26
350	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912227	MCNAMARA EL	04	15.38	66
351	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912104	ALMEIDA EL	04	14.29	26
352	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912139	DODSON EL	04	14.29	46
353	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912240	SHERMAN EL	04	13.96	93
354	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912256	WHARTON EL	04	13.79	29
355	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912237	SCARBOROUGH EL	04	13.75	86
356	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912198	LOVE EL	04	13.33	30
357	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912261	CHATHAM EL	04	13.33	30
358	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912207	MONTGOMERY EL	04	13.16	76
359	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912152	FIELD EL	04	12.90	62
360	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912201	MACGREGOR EL	04	12.73	55
361	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912129	CLINTON PARK EL	04	12.50	16
362	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912264	MITCHELL EL	04	12.33	73
363	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912196	LONGFELLOW EL	04	12.26	106
364	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912244	SOUTHMAID EL	04	12.12	66
365	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912257	WHIDBY EL	04	12.07	58
366	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912113	BOWIE EL	04	12.00	50
367	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912162	GREGG EL	04	11.90	42
368	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912117	BRISCOE EL	04	11.32	53
369	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912157	GARDEN OAKS EL	04	11.32	53
370	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912246	STEVENSON EL	04	11.11	36
371	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912274	ASKEW EL	04	11.11	108
372	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912133	CORNELIUS EL	04	10.92	119
373	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912172	HENDERSON N EL	04	10.77	65
374	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912223	PUGH EL	04	10.53	38
375	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912115	DURHAM EL	04	10.34	58
376	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912166	HARRIS J R EL	04	10.34	58
377	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912248	SUTTON EL	04	10.34	87
378	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912107	BARRICK EL	04	10.00	70
379	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912273	ASHFORD EL	04	9.91	111
380	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912124	BURNET EL	04	9.84	61
381	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912268	BENBROOK EL	04	9.52	42
382	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912212	OATES EL	04	9.33	75
383	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912220	PLEASANTVILLE E	04	8.86	79
384	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912233	RUCKER EL	04	8.75	80

.-LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
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(LBBS.GENERIC.GRUSDORF(STDACHV))

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	CAMPUS NUMBER	CAMPUS NAME	GRADE TESTED	PERCENT FAILING	NUMBER TESTED
385	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912118	BROCK EL	04	8.70	23
386	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912132	COOP EL	04	8.62	58
387	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912250	TURNER EL	04	8.47	59
388	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912136	CUNNINGHAM EL	04	8.33	60
389	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912267	WHITE EL	04	8.33	72
390	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912135	CROCKETT EL	04	7.69	39
391	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912254	WESLEY EL	04	7.69	104
392	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912151	BELL EL	04	7.41	81
393	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912238	SCOTT EL	04	7.14	28
394	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912203	MADING EL	04	6.98	86
395	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912211	OAK FOREST EL	04	6.48	108
396	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912175	HOBBS EL	04	6.19	113
397	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912215	PARKER EL	04	6.19	97
398	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912249	TRAVIS EL	04	5.71	70
399	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912164	GRIMES EL	04	5.45	55
400	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912224	RED EL	04	5.19	77
401	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912130	CONDIT EL	04	5.06	79
402	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912182	JEFFERSON EL	04	4.69	64
403	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912242	SMITH EL	04	4.55	88
404	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912286	HERRERA	04	4.41	68
405	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912121	BRUCE EL	04	4.35	46
406	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912231	ROOSEVELT EL	04	4.35	46
407	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912253	WALNUT BEND EL	04	4.29	70
408	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912252	WAINWRIGHT EL	04	4.05	74
409	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912275	BUSH	04	3.70	81
410	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912221	POE EL	04	3.61	83
411	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912255	WEST UNIVERSITY	04	3.59	167
412	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912204	MEMORIAL EL	04	3.23	31
413	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912173	HEROD EL	04	3.16	95
414	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912116	BRIARGROVE EL	04	3.03	92
415	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912178	HORN EL	04	2.56	72
416	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912199	LOVETT EL	04	2.41	83
417	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912188	KENNEDY EL	04	2.33	43
418	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912230	WILL ROGERS EL	04	1.43	70
419	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912180	ISAACS EL	04	0.00	56
420	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912189	KOLTER EL	04	0.00	73
421	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912228	RIVER OAKS EL	04	0.00	84
422	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912229	ROBERTS EL	04	0.00	56
423	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912251	MARK TWAIN EL	04	0.00	40
424	101912	HOUSTON ISD	101912296	T H ROGERS ED C	04	0.00	41

.,=LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED

APPENDIX D

Cost per Student

Passing
TAAS *

(Since tests are only administered at grades 4, 8, & 10, calculations assume that other students are performing at the same achievement levels.)

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT DATA USING TAAS SCORES BY CAMPUS FOR SPRING 93
GRUSENDORF REQUEST - RUN #4
(LBBS.GENERIC.GRUSNDRF(STDACH4A))

14:54 Monday, May 16, 1994 24

OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
1	064901	ASHERTON	95,391
2	071904	SAN ELIZARIO	59,734
3	102901	KARNACK	44,448
4	031913	SANTA MARIA	40,391
5	242904	ALLISON	37,458
6	254902	LA PRYOR	36,718
7	147901	COOLIDGE	36,013
8	066901	BENAVIDES	33,906
9	245904	SAN PERLITA	32,981
10	240904	WEBB CONS	32,086
11	108914	LA VILLA	31,745
12	066902	SAN DIEGO	30,885
13	015905	EDGEWOOD	30,607
14	135001	GUTHRIE CSD	30,546
15	178915	WEST OSO	30,216
16	195902	BALMORHEA	30,102
17	178909	ROBSTOWN	29,972
18	254901	CRYSTAL CITY	29,952
19	115901	FT HANCOCK	29,698
20	108905	HIDALGO	29,506
21	084908	HITCHCOCK	29,433
22	108902	DONNA	29,047
23	042905	PANTHER CREEK CONS	28,607
24	015907	SAN ANTONIO	28,597
25	015904	HARLANDALE	28,380
26	115903	DELL CITY	28,106
27	214901	RIO GRANDE CITY	27,999
28	071907	CANUTILLO	27,803
29	071908	TORNILLO	27,467
30	062902	NORDHEIM	27,340
31	189902	PRESIDIO	26,598
32	220909	MASONIC HOME	25,904
33	145907	OAKWOOD	25,811
34	153905	NEW HOME	25,564
35	132902	JAYTON-GIRARD	25,396
36	201903	LANEVILLE	25,176
37	071903	FABENS	24,965
38	093905	RICHARDS	24,763
39	142901	COTULLA	24,753
40	108912	LA JOYA	24,688
41	214903	ROMA	24,422
42	108913	WESLACO	24,229
43	057920	WILMER-HUTCHINS	24,196
44	162904	MCMULLEN COUNTY	23,792
45	210904	TENAHA	23,702
46	145902	CENTERVILLE	23,584
47	187906	LEGGETT	23,571
48	108903	EDCOUCH-ELSA	22,749
49	040902	WHITEFACE CONS	22,630

.=LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED OR 0 PASSING

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 GRUSENDORF REQUEST - RUN #4
 (LBBS.GENERIC.GRUSNDRF(STDACH4A))

14:54 Monday, May 16, 1994 25

OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
50	238904	GRANDFALLS-ROYALTY	22,472
51	017901	BORDEN COUNTY	22,405
52	101909	NORTH FOREST	22,359
53	031901	BROWNSVILLE	22,343
54	015917	SOUTHSIDE	22,043
55	126906	KEENE	22,022
56	015909	SOMERSET	22,013
57	042906	NOVICE	21,716
58	244901	HARROLD	21,656
59	064903	CARRIZO SPRINGS CONS	21,462
60	015908	SOUTH SAN ANTONIO	21,423
61	031914	SANTA ROSA	21,362
62	108910	PROGRESO	21,106
63	213901	GLEN ROSE	21,049
64	052901	CRANE	21,019
65	037908	NEW SUMMERFIELD	20,894
66	083901	SEAGRAVES	20,776
67	067908	RISING STAR	20,679
68	140901	AMHERST	20,661
69	161914	WACO	20,451
70	037901	ALTO	20,436
71	082902	DILLEY	20,330
72	168903	WESTBROOK	20,250
73	205904	MATHIS	20,230
74	253901	ZAPATA	20,068
75	174909	MARTINSVILLE	20,014
76	083902	LOOP	20,001
77	237905	ROYAL	19,997
78	123913	SABINE PASS	19,845
79	035902	HART	19,787
80	063906	PATTON SPRINGS	19,703
81	045903	RICE CONS	19,514
82	054902	LORENZO	19,460
83	240902	MIRANDO CITY	19,431
84	024901	BROOKS	19,290
85	248902	WINK-LOVING	19,246
86	198905	HEARNE	19,241
87	090902	LEFORS	19,190
88	007901	CHARLOTTE	19,161
89	153907	WILSON	19,122
90	168902	LORAIN	19,001
91	015912	SOUTHWEST	18,958
92	108916	VALLEY VIEW	18,944
93	140908	SUDAN	18,755
94	245902	LYFORD	18,727
95	057905	DALLAS	18,721
96	163902	D'HANIS	18,708
97	189901	MARFA	18,704
98	055901	CULBERSON COUNTY	18,682

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LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
99	015914	FT SAM HOUSTON	18,673
100	026903	SNOOK	18,651
101	113906	KENNARD	18,590
102	103901	CHANNING	18,557
103	082903	PEARSALL	18,532
104	197902	MIAMI	18,464
105	194905	DETROIT	18,400
106	108909	PHARR-SAN JUAN-ALAMO	18,380
107	040901	MORTON	18,319
108	069901	ROCKSPRINGS	18,264
109	181906	WEST ORANGE-COVE CONS	18,036
110	168901	COLORADO	17,830
111	018907	KOPPERL	17,816
112	198901	BREMOND	17,795
113	125902	BEN BOLT-PALITO BLANCO	17,737
114	201913	CARLISLE	17,694
115	125905	PREMONT	17,610
116	140906	SPADE	17,600
117	202903	HEMPHILL	17,582
118	084902	GALVESTON	17,552
119	022902	MARATHON	17,513
120	137903	RIVIERA	17,377
121	237902	HEMPSTEAD	17,362
122	108907	MERCEDES	17,345
123	187903	GOODRICH	17,343
124	170907	SPLENDORA	17,331
125	110908	WHITHARRAL	17,210
126	123907	PORT ARTHUR	17,160
127	126908	VENUS	17,134
128	071901	CLINT	17,072
129	128903	RUNGE	17,034
130	228903	TRINITY	17,016
131	104902	ROCHESTER	17,000
132	124901	JIM HOGG COUNTY	16,998
133	231901	MCCAMEY	16,981
134	081905	WORTHAM	16,965
135	084903	HIGH ISLAND	16,925
136	043917	BLUE RIDGE	16,910
137	186903	IRAAN-SHEFFIELD	16,785
138	220910	LAKE WORTH	16,673
139	058902	DAWSON	16,633
140	176901	BURKEVILLE	16,630
141	007906	POTEET	16,589
142	229905	SPURGER	16,524
143	169910	FORESTBURG	16,514
144	031912	SAN BENITO CONS	16,405
145	159901	EAGLE PASS	16,393
146	003905	DIBOLL	16,386
147	240903	UNITED	16,376

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
148	003906	ZAVALLA	16,359
149	167903	STAR	16,356
150	123910	BEAUMONT	16,340
151	066903	FREER	16,232
152	071906	ANTHONY	16,195
153	235901	BLOOMINGTON	16,189
154	073901	CHILTON	16,183
155	217901	ASPERMONT	16,164
156	101924	SHELDON	16,119
157	240901	LAREDO	16,112
158	206901	SAN SABA	16,092
159	071909	SOCORRO	16,059
160	231902	RANKIN	16,024
161	107907	TRINIDAD	15,975
162	138903	MUNDAY	15,899
163	245903	RAYMONDVILLE	15,894
164	205907	TAFT	15,886
165	203902	BROADDUS	15,884
166	084906	TEXAS CITY	15,882
167	110907	SUNDOWN	15,817
168	146901	CLEVELAND	15,798
169	242906	FORT ELLIOTT CONS	15,773
170	084904	LA MARQUE	15,764
171	108904	EDINBURG	15,745
172	071905	YSLETA	15,734
173	148903	HIGGINS	15,734
174	096904	MEMPHIS	15,733
175	220905	FORT WORTH	15,715
176	058909	SANDS	15,681
177	186902	FT STOCKTON	15,650
178	109902	BYNUM	15,630
179	147902	GROESBECK	15,619
180	110905	ROPES	15,558
181	101912	HOUSTON	15,534
182	095902	COTTON CENTER	15,527
183	163903	NATALIA	15,472
184	108908	MISSION CONS	15,464
185	160904	ROCHELLE	15,462
186	251902	PLAINS	15,456
187	122901	FT DAVIS	15,456
188	206902	RICHLAND SPRINGS	15,410
189	248901	KERMIT	15,403
190	183901	BECKVILLE	15,366
191	074904	DODD CITY	15,333
192	112906	NORTH HOPKINS	15,325
193	229901	COLMESNEIL	15,309
194	009901	MULESHOE	15,295
195	216901	STERLING CITY	15,290
196	169911	SAINT JO	15,214

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
197	146905	HULL-DAISETTA	15,208
198	185904	LAZBUDDIE	15,201
199	031911	RIO HONDO	15,166
200	103902	HARTLEY	15,093
201	153903	O'DONNELL	15,076
202	173901	MOTLEY COUNTY	15,073
203	187901	BIG SANDY	15,067
204	060914	FANNINDEL	15,058
205	085902	POST	15,051
206	161906	LA VEGA	15,022
207	227912	LAGO VISTA	15,003
208	232903	UVALDE CONS	14,982
209	156905	GRADY	14,979
210	130902	COMFORT	14,943
211	204901	COLDSPRING-OAKHURST CONS	14,931
212	152903	SLATON	14,914
213	249906	PARADISE	14,896
214	121902	BROOKELAND	14,885
215	111902	LIPAN	14,876
216	013901	BEEVILLE	14,842
217	051901	PADUCAH	14,826
218	128902	KENEDY	14,805
219	223901	BROWNFIELD	14,773
220	037909	WELLS	14,740
221	083903	SEMINOLE	14,739
222	054903	RALLS	14,682
223	178908	PORT ARANSAS	14,672
224	070909	MILFORD	14,664
225	222901	TERRELL COUNTY	14,647
226	232901	KNIPPA	14,646
227	241906	LOUISE	14,645
228	138902	KNOX CITY-O'BRIEN	14,626
229	042903	SANTA ANNA	14,623
230	228905	APPLE SPRINGS	14,616
231	176902	NEWTON	14,607
232	187904	CORRIGAN-CAMDEN	14,595
233	091917	GUNTER	14,582
234	205906	SINTON	14,560
235	210903	SHELBYVILLE	14,551
236	194904	CLARKSVILLE	14,528
237	234909	FRUITVALE	14,437
238	084901	DICKINSON	14,434
239	178913	BANQUETE	14,431
240	136901	BRACKETT	14,425
241	152908	ROOSEVELT	14,409
242	002901	ANDREWS	14,400
243	095904	PETERSBURG	14,310
244	109912	AQUILLA	14,281
245	071902	EL PASO	14,259

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
246	121906	EVADALE	14,257
247	026902	SOMERVILLE	14,199
248	065902	HEDLEY	14,190
249	214902	SAN ISIDRO	14,185
250	047903	GUSTINE	14,182
251	034909	BLOOMBURG	14,181
252	153904	TAHOKA	14,160
253	041901	BRONTE	14,146
254	077901	FLOYDADA	14,118
255	101916	LA PORTE	14,055
256	212901	ARP	13,991
257	174901	CHIRENO	13,940
258	133901	CENTER POINT	13,928
259	249908	SLIDELL	13,919
260	176903	DEWEYVILLE	13,887
261	219905	KRESS	13,878
262	238902	MONAHANS-WICKETT-PYOTE	13,838
263	233901	SAN FELIPE-DEL RIO CONS	13,827
264	154903	NORTH ZULCH	13,822
265	109907	ITASCA	13,821
266	054901	CROSBYTON	13,813
267	210901	CENTER	13,802
268	112907	MILLER GROVE	13,770
269	014902	BARTLETT	13,762
270	125903	ORANGE GROVE	13,759
271	205901	ARANSAS PASS	13,738
272	031909	POINT ISABEL	13,731
273	203901	SAN AUGUSTINE	13,723
274	201914	WEST RUSK	13,722
275	077902	LOCKNEY	13,641
276	137901	KINGSVILLE	13,632
277	125901	ALICE	13,612
278	029901	CALHOUN CO	13,606
279	246907	JARRELL	13,603
280	156902	STANTON	13,596
281	229904	WARREN	13,589
282	070901	AVALON	13,567
283	146904	HARDIN	13,561
284	195901	PECOS-BARSTOW-TOYAH	13,539
285	210905	TIMPSON	13,524
286	118902	IRION CO	13,462
287	059901	HEREFORD	13,428
288	031903	HARLINGEN CONS	13,398
289	110902	LEVELLAND	13,388
290	220904	EVERMAN	13,374
291	237904	WALLER	13,368
292	039901	BYERS	13,357
293	110901	ANTON	13,351
294	192901	REAGAN COUNTY	13,349

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
295	184901	POOLVILLE	13,341
296	112905	CUMBY	13,328
297	227907	MANOR	13,326
298	036902	BARBERS HILL	13,326
299	232902	SABINAL	13,320
300	074905	ECTOR	13,311
301	011902	ELGIN	13,294
302	035901	DIMMITT	13,247
303	251901	DENVER CITY	13,173
304	031906	LOS FRESNOS CONS	13,164
305	140905	OLTON	13,163
306	108906	MCALLEN	13,105
307	073903	MARLIN	13,100
308	089903	NIXON-SMILEY CONS	13,099
309	196901	AUSTWELL-TIVOLI	13,089
310	155901	JEFFERSON	13,073
311	205905	ODEM-EDROY	13,073
312	145901	BUFFALO	13,028
313	069902	NUECES CANYON CONS	13,016
314	090903	MCLEAN	13,010
315	093903	IOLA	13,004
316	094901	SEGUIN	12,994
317	196903	REFUGIO	12,993
318	204904	SHEPHERD	12,992
319	158905	PALACIOS	12,978
320	198903	FRANKLIN	12,962
321	095903	HALE CENTER	12,952
322	127905	LUEDERS-AVOCA	12,947
323	018904	VALLEY MILLS	12,900
324	183904	GARY	12,899
325	230904	UNION HILL	12,894
326	212910	WINONA	12,869
327	034903	HUGHES SPRINGS	12,859
328	163904	HONDO	12,854
329	101921	TOMBALL	12,820
330	139909	PARIS	12,820
331	212909	CHAPEL HILL	12,817
332	007904	LYTLE	12,814
333	145911	LEON	12,798
334	107905	EUSTACE	12,769
335	164901	MENARD	12,764
336	227901	AUSTIN	12,756
337	013903	PETTUS	12,753
338	188903	HIGHLAND PARK	12,751
339	178901	AGUA DULCE	12,730
340	167902	MULLIN	12,717
341	010901	MEDINA	12,654
342	224902	WOODSON	12,608
343	180901	BOYS RANCH	12,583

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
344	178904	CORPUS CHRISTI	12,576
345	227910	DEL VALLE	12,571
346	160901	BRADY	12,559
347	241904	WHARTON	12,554
348	101905	CHANNELVIEW	12,546
349	225902	MOUNT PLEASANT	12,545
350	053001	CROCKETT CO CONS	12,529
351	201907	MOUNT ENTERPRISE	12,514
352	208903	IRA	12,490
353	230901	BIG SANDY	12,467
354	101910	GALENA PARK	12,436
355	045905	WEIMAR	12,393
356	246905	GRANGER	12,379
357	147903	MEXIA	12,368
358	014906	KILLEEN	12,367
359	043904	FARMERSVILLE	12,363
360	126907	RIO VISTA	12,356
361	031905	LA FERIA	12,350
362	175904	DAWSON	12,342
363	152901	LUBBOCK	12,339
364	170908	NEW CANEY	12,322
365	101908	DEER PARK	12,309
366	058905	KLONDIKE	12,308
367	109904	HILLSBORO	12,292
368	093904	NAVASOTA	12,287
369	196902	WOODSBORO	12,283
370	079910	STAFFORD MSD	12,269
371	011904	SMITHVILLE	12,260
372	079901	LAMAR CONS	12,260
373	148902	FOLLETT	12,242
374	158906	VAN VLECK	12,209
375	185901	BOVINA	12,205
376	177905	HIGHLAND	12,184
377	015911	EAST CENTRAL	12,181
378	174904	NACOGDOCHES	12,164
379	030906	EULA	12,163
380	068901	ECTOR COUNTY	12,160
381	119903	PERRIN-WHITT CONS	12,156
382	096905	TURKEY-QUITAQUE	12,081
383	139905	CHISUM	12,079
384	019907	TEXARKANA	12,068
385	100908	WEST HARDIN COUNTY CONS	12,066
386	101902	ALDINE	12,063
387	154901	MADISONVILLE CONS	12,057
388	226901	CHRISTOVAL	12,045
389	034902	AVINGER	12,040
390	101917	PASADENA	12,036
391	092903	LONGVIEW	12,036
392	102902	MARSHALL	12,012

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
393	084909	SANTA FE	12,012
394	220917	CASTLEBERRY	11,996
395	146907	TARKINGTON	11,994
396	167904	PRIDDY	11,960
397	169909	PRAIRIE VALLEY	11,950
398	034907	QUEEN CITY	11,945
399	161910	MOODY	11,944
400	107901	ATHENS	11,920
401	116910	CAMPBELL	11,890
402	027903	BURNET CONS	11,889
403	175903	CORSICANA	11,873
404	004901	ARANSAS COUNTY	11,869
405	074909	LEONARD	11,855
406	194902	AVERY	11,850
407	091902	COLLINSVILLE	11,849
408	056902	TEXLINE	11,846
409	107906	MALAKOFF	11,839
410	170903	MONTGOMERY	11,823
411	013905	SKIDMORE-TYNAN	11,811
412	001906	NECHES	11,808
413	224901	THROCKMORTON	11,807
414	108911	SHARYLAND	11,805
415	178902	BISHOP CONS	11,793
416	021902	BRYAN	11,770
417	177903	BLACKWELL CONS	11,746
418	086902	HARPER	11,738
419	178912	TULOSO-MIDWAY	11,714
420	182902	GRAFORD	11,704
421	015913	LACKLAND	11,690
422	233903	COMSTOCK	11,675
423	228901	GROVETON	11,674
424	201908	OVERTON	11,629
425	003904	HUNTINGTON	11,619
426	236901	NEW WAVERLY	11,617
427	127901	ANSON	11,614
428	169902	NOCONA	11,604
429	184904	MILLSAP	11,602
430	007905	PLEASANTON	11,600
431	043902	ANNA	11,579
432	208901	HERMLEIGH	11,576
433	105902	SAN MARCOS CONS	11,574
434	236902	HUNTSVILLE	11,560
435	149902	THREE RIVERS	11,542
436	110906	SMYER	11,525
437	048903	PAINT ROCK	11,520
438	050904	OGLESBY	11,500
439	229903	WOODVILLE	11,477
440	001907	PALESTINE	11,473
441	044902	WELLINGTON	11,469

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
442	061903	PILOT POINT	11,462
443	043918	COMMUNITY	11,453
444	101903	ALIEF	11,444
445	095905	PLAINVIEW	11,437
446	039903	PETROLIA	11,436
447	076904	ROTAN	11,423
448	250903	MINEOLA	11,419
449	003903	LUFKIN	11,367
450	212904	TROUP	11,364
451	087901	GLASSCOCK	11,329
452	205903	INGLESIDE	11,325
453	182904	SANTO	11,324
454	030903	BAIRD	11,324
455	170906	MAGNOLIA	11,312
456	078901	CROWELL	11,299
457	034901	ATLANTA	11,237
458	249904	CHICO	11,235
459	114904	FORSAN	11,233
460	113903	LOVELADY	11,178
461	008903	WALLIS-ORCHARD	11,145
462	111903	TOLAR	11,131
463	113901	CROCKETT	11,125
464	019909	SIMMS	11,124
465	070910	PALMER	11,118
466	076903	ROBY CONS	11,112
467	072902	DUBLIN	11,101
468	152902	NEW DEAL	11,095
469	067902	CISCO	11,093
470	200902	MILES	11,083
471	187907	LIVINGSTON	11,078
472	063903	SPUR	11,064
473	043907	MCKINNEY	11,063
474	129904	KEMP	11,060
475	200904	WINTERS	11,033
476	100903	KOUNTZE	11,026
477	038901	CHILDRESS	11,020
478	116905	GREENVILLE	11,019
479	081904	TEAGUE	11,002
480	025905	MAY	10,996
481	235902	VICTORIA	10,988
482	120905	INDUSTRIAL	10,985
483	129906	TERRELL	10,973
484	166903	MILANO	10,973
485	230908	UNION GROVE	10,971
486	101911	GOOSE CREEK	10,958
487	101920	SPRING BRANCH	10,954
488	127903	HAMLIN	10,953
489	050910	COPPERAS COVE	10,938
490	184902	SPRINGTOWN	10,925

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
491	120902	GANADO	10,912
492	074917	SAM RAYBURN	10,895
493	226905	WATER VALLEY	10,893
494	109911	WHITNEY	10,877
495	219903	TULIA	10,874
496	061914	LITTLE ELM	10,864
497	070907	ITALY	10,858
498	126901	ALVARADO	10,856
499	025904	BLANKET	10,844
500	133904	INGRAM	10,842
501	174903	GARRISON	10,833
502	081902	FAIRFIELD	10,830
503	018908	CRANFILLS GAP	10,825
504	126911	GOODLEY	10,824
505	172902	DAINGERFIELD-LONE STAR	10,811
506	094902	SCHERTZ-CIBOLO-U CITY	10,810
507	033904	WHITE DEER	10,807
508	037904	JACKSONVILLE	10,783
509	105906	HAYS CONS	10,778
510	101925	HUFFMAN	10,777
511	025901	BANGS	10,757
512	001903	ELKHART	10,744
513	048901	EDEN CONS	10,744
514	194903	TALCO-BOGATA CONS	10,742
515	106901	CANADIAN	10,731
516	241901	BOLING	10,713
517	218901	SONORA	10,709
518	219901	HAPPY	10,675
519	014905	HOLLAND	10,662
520	234904	GRAND SALINE	10,649
521	036903	EAST CHAMBERS	10,640
522	058906	LAMESA	10,634
523	210902	JOAQUIN	10,623
524	062901	CUERO	10,615
525	104903	RULE	10,611
526	020902	ANGLETON	10,607
527	250902	HAWKINS	10,593
528	239901	BRENNHAM	10,591
529	050902	GATESVILLE	10,589
530	121904	JASPER	10,580
531	088902	GOLIAD	10,570
532	074911	SAVOY	10,556
533	246908	LIBERTY HILL	10,552
534	073905	ROSEBUD-LOTT	10,530
535	070903	ENNIS	10,522
536	175902	BLOOMING GROVE	10,522
537	067907	RANGER	10,518
538	141901	LAMPASAS	10,517
539	201910	TATUM	10,514

.-LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED OR 0 PASSING

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
540	043903	CELINA	10,510
541	249903	BRIDGEPORT	10,508
542	019902	HOOKS	10,497
543	212905	TYLER	10,495
544	220914	KENNEDALE	10,485
545	170904	WILLIS	10,482
546	074903	BONHAM	10,469
547	163901	DEVINE	10,465
548	011901	BASTROP	10,446
549	028902	LOCKHART	10,431
550	223904	WELLMAN	10,415
551	101906	CROSBY	10,411
552	117904	PLEMONS-STINNETT-PHILLIPS CONS	10,403
553	092902	KILGORE	10,399
554	070912	WAXAHACHIE	10,388
555	095901	ABERNATHY	10,373
556	036901	ANAHUAC	10,372
557	109913	BLUM	10,366
558	015915	NORTHSIDE	10,362
559	061911	NORTHWEST	10,349
560	022901	ALPINE	10,346
561	129905	MABANK	10,339
562	121905	KIRBYVILLE	10,333
563	175905	FROST	10,333
564	116916	BOLES	10,332
565	157901	MASON	10,307
566	166905	THORNDALE	10,299
567	114901	BIG SPRING	10,292
568	188901	AMARILLO	10,292
569	057913	LANCASTER	10,291
570	152909	SHALLOWATER	10,291
571	126905	JOSHUA	10,275
572	193902	LEAKEY	10,274
573	221911	JIM NED CONS	10,268
574	128901	KARNES CITY	10,266
575	042901	COLEMAN	10,239
576	116915	BLAND	10,221
577	062904	YORKTOWN	10,216
578	152910	IDALOU	10,210
579	139908	ROXTON	10,200
580	023902	SILVERTON	10,182
581	014909	TEMPLE	10,178
582	047905	SIDNEY	10,176
583	175910	MILDRED	10,173
584	149901	GEORGE WEST	10,159
585	016902	BLANCO	10,141
586	201902	HENDERSON	10,126
587	028903	LULING	10,116
588	121903	BUNA	10,098

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
589	232904	UTOPIA	10,070
590	127906	STAMFORD	10,061
591	182903	MINERAL WELLS	10,058
592	100904	SILSBEE	10,057
593	229906	CHESTER	10,043
594	099902	CHILLICOTHE	10,038
595	037907	RUSK	10,022
596	134901	JUNCTION	10,020
597	001909	SLOCUM	10,001
598	015906	RANDOLPH FIELD	9,988
599	129910	SCURRY-ROSSER	9,982
600	215901	BRECKENRIDGE	9,982
601	019903	MAUD	9,981
602	226903	SAN ANGELO	9,970
603	116908	QUINLAN	9,952
604	165901	MIDLAND	9,948
605	126903	CLEBURNE	9,946
606	252902	NEWCASTLE	9,938
607	128904	FALLS CITY	9,938
608	243902	ELECTRA	9,927
609	102906	ELYSIAN FIELDS	9,927
610	177901	ROSCOE	9,895
611	242902	SHAMROCK	9,889
612	144903	DIME BOX	9,881
613	140907	SPRINGLAKE-EARTH	9,874
614	057910	GRAND PRAIRIE	9,870
615	114902	COAHOMA	9,848
616	246911	TAYLOR	9,847
617	174908	CENTRAL HEIGHTS	9,846
618	223902	MEADOW	9,846
619	094904	MARION	9,826
620	061901	DENTON	9,824
621	119902	JACKSBORO	9,815
622	001902	CAVUGA	9,807
623	093901	ANDERSON-SHIRO CONS	9,804
624	145906	NORMANGEE	9,803
625	211902	STRATFORD	9,803
626	072909	LINGLEVILLE	9,798
627	221905	TRENT	9,792
628	230906	NEW DIANA	9,789
629	107902	BROWNSBORO	9,761
630	250906	ALBA-GOLDEN	9,752
631	019908	LIBERTY-EVLAU	9,732
632	019901	DEKALB	9,718
633	044904	SAMNORWOOD	9,712
634	183902	CARTHAGE	9,711
635	075903	SCHULENBURG	9,708
636	247901	FLORESVILLE	9,703
637	161908	MART	9,701

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
638	113902	GRAPELAND	9,689
639	246902	FLORENCE	9,687
640	091903	DENISON	9,685
641	100905	HARDIN-JEFFERSON	9,675
642	001904	FRANKSTON	9,663
643	046901	NEW BRAUNFELS	9,660
644	020901	ALVIN	9,646
645	089901	GONZALES	9,624
646	102905	HARLETON	9,622
647	109905	HUBBARD	9,613
648	034906	MCLEOD	9,607
649	045902	COLUMBUS	9,606
650	092901	GLADEWATER	9,605
651	102903	WASKOM	9,603
652	158901	BAY CITY	9,601
653	101919	SPRING	9,593
654	166904	ROCKDALE	9,586
655	049901	GAINESVILLE	9,586
656	152906	LUBBOCK-COOPER	9,582
657	161909	MCGREGOR	9,580
658	116901	CADDO MILLS	9,571
659	085903	SOUTHLAND	9,568
660	117903	SANFORD	9,566
661	014910	TROY	9,559
662	172905	PEWITT	9,556
663	182905	STRAWN	9,546
664	249905	DECATUR	9,539
665	184903	WEATHERFORD	9,532
666	158902	TIDEHAVEN	9,527
667	025902	BROWNWOOD	9,493
668	249902	BOYD	9,464
669	003902	HUDSON	9,461
670	148901	BOOKER	9,454
671	014903	BELTON	9,436
672	057907	DUNCANVILLE	9,429
673	161921	CONNALLY	9,427
674	207901	SCHLEICHER	9,426
675	014901	ACADEMY	9,419
676	074912	TRENTON	9,395
677	249901	ALVORD	9,373
678	140904	LITTLEFIELD	9,356
679	250905	YANTIS	9,351
680	033902	PANHANDLE	9,334
681	112910	SULPHUR BLUFF	9,334
682	057904	CEDAR HILL	9,319
683	062903	YOAKUM	9,316
684	008902	SEALY	9,313
685	175907	KERENS	9,313
686	239903	BURTON	9,312

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
687	070905	FERRIS	9,302
688	181907	VIDOR	9,298
689	010902	BANDERA	9,273
690	012901	SEYMOUR	9,270
691	072908	HUCKABAY	9,254
692	230903	ORE CITY	9,236
693	220915	AZLE	9,223
694	185903	FRIONA	9,217
695	241903	EL CAMPO	9,207
696	091906	SHERMAN	9,199
697	070915	MAYPEARL	9,195
698	202905	WEST SABINE	9,189
699	107910	LA POYNOR	9,185
700	098901	GRUVER	9,172
701	075901	FLATONIA	9,167
702	144901	GIDDINGS	9,156
703	129901	CRANDALL	9,142
704	188902	RIVER ROAD	9,135
705	020907	COLUMBIA-BRAZORIA	9,102
706	067904	GORMAN	9,092
707	119901	BRYSON	9,091
708	015916	JUDSON	9,079
709	126904	GRANDVIEW	9,067
710	182901	GORDON	9,058
711	144902	LEXINGTON	9,051
712	221901	ABILENE	9,043
713	113905	LATEXO	9,042
714	227913	LAKE TRAVIS	9,041
715	091908	VAN ALSTYNE	9,041
716	014908	SALADO	9,034
717	234907	WILLS POINT	9,034
718	039904	BELLEVUE	9,032
719	247904	POTH	9,026
720	065901	CLARENDON	9,025
721	049905	CALLISBURG	9,021
722	018905	WALNUT SPRINGS	8,994
723	057914	MESQUITE	8,994
724	007902	JOURDANTON	8,973
725	120901	EDNA	8,972
726	184909	BROCK	8,962
727	008901	BELLVILLE	8,960
728	184908	PEASTER	8,954
729	243905	WICHITA FALLS	8,946
730	057903	CARROLLTON-FARMERS BRANCH	8,943
731	171902	SUNRAY	8,940
732	129903	KAUFMAN	8,937
733	221904	MERKEL	8,928
734	020906	SWEENY	8,875
735	220902	BIRDVILLE	8,873

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
736	070911	RED OAK	8,871
737	061908	SANGER	8,852
738	015910	NORTH EAST	8,850
739	091910	WHITEWRIGHT	8,849
740	020905	BRAZOSPORT	8,844
741	027904	MARBLE FALLS	8,834
742	001908	WESTWOOD	8,833
743	165902	GREENWOOD	8,819
744	016901	JOHNSON CITY	8,812
745	127904	HAWLEY	8,806
746	146906	LIBERTY	8,805
747	050901	EVANT	8,805
748	014907	ROGERS	8,804
749	212902	BULLARD	8,774
750	090904	PAMPA	8,770
751	230905	HARMONY	8,753
752	170902	CONROE	8,746
753	104901	HASKELL	8,733
754	250904	QUITMAN	8,715
755	241902	EAST BERNARD	8,711
756	234903	EDGEWOOD	8,702
757	247903	LA VERNIA	8,698
758	020904	DANBURY	8,670
759	161912	RIESEL	8,669
760	091905	HOWE	8,668
761	070908	MIDLOTHIAN	8,664
762	025906	ZEPHYR	8,651
763	111901	GRANBURY	8,643
764	047902	DE LEON	8,637
765	006902	CLAUDE	8,631
766	043912	PROSPER	8,616
767	026901	CALDWELL	8,616
768	032902	PITTSBURG	8,614
769	178914	FLOUR BLUFF	8,609
770	099903	QUANAH	8,608
771	033901	GROOM	8,593
772	107904	CROSS ROADS	8,576
773	190903	RAINS	8,572
774	005904	WINDTHORST	8,559
775	126902	BURLESON	8,554
776	079907	FORT BEND	8,539
777	171901	DUMAS	8,537
778	220901	ARLINGTON	8,530
779	043911	PRINCETON	8,529
780	057912	IRVING	8,525
781	177902	SWEETWATER	8,523
782	102904	HALLSVILLE	8,521
783	019905	NEW BOSTON	8,519
784	092908	WHITE OAK	8,488

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
785	185902	FARWELL	8,470
786	112908	COMO-PICKTON	8,469
787	180902	VEGA	8,448
788	049903	VALLEY VIEW	8,444
789	046902	COMAL	8,443
790	043905	FRISCO	8,435
791	247906	STOCKDALE	8,427
792	030901	CROSS PLAINS	8,426
793	091901	BELLS	8,411
794	030902	CLYDE CONS	8,408
795	179901	PERRYTON	8,372
796	146902	DAYTON	8,357
797	133903	KERRVILLE	8,331
798	244903	VERNON	8,328
799	161916	WEST	8,312
800	079906	NEEDVILLE	8,309
801	057906	DE SOTO	8,309
802	220908	MANSFIELD	8,297
803	020908	PEARLAND	8,292
804	129902	FORNEY	8,280
805	003907	CENTRAL	8,275
806	091913	POTTSBORO	8,256
807	117901	BORGER	8,221
808	116906	LONE OAK	8,220
809	094903	NAVARRO	8,220
810	057916	RICHARDSON	8,189
811	116903	COMMERCE	8,185
812	150901	LLANO	8,182
813	228904	CENTERVILLE	8,181
814	061912	LAKE DALLAS	8,176
815	174902	CUSHING	8,175
816	015901	ALAMO HEIGHTS	8,168
817	161907	LORENA	8,162
818	092906	SABINE	8,135
819	086901	FREDERICKSBURG	8,131
820	100907	LUMBERTON	8,126
821	252901	GRAHAM	8,113
822	075902	LA GRANGE	8,110
823	208902	SNYDER	8,104
824	181905	ORANGEFIELD	8,093
825	091918	TOM BEAN	8,086
826	050909	JONESBORO	8,083
827	116909	WOLFE CITY	8,080
828	220918	EAGLE MT-SAGINAW	8,064
829	091914	S AND S CONS	8,050
830	047901	COMANCHE	8,050
831	199902	ROYSE CITY	8,047
832	043901	ALLEN	8,046
833	056901	DALHART	8,029

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
834	234905	MARTINS MILL	8,025
835	074907	HONEY GROVE	8,022
836	039902	HENRIETTA	8,020
837	246913	LEANDER	8,017
838	101907	CYPRESS-FAIRBANKS	7,987
839	220912	CROWLEY	7,983
840	234902	CANTON	7,978
841	097902	HAMILTON	7,969
842	075908	ROUND TOP-CARMINE	7,958
843	098904	SPEARMAN	7,938
844	250907	WINNSBORO	7,932
845	166901	CAMERON	7,910
846	205902	GREGORY-PORTLAND	7,909
847	161918	AXTELL	7,906
848	101915	KLEIN	7,898
849	243901	BURKBURNETT	7,890
850	034905	LINDEN-KILDARE CONS	7,835
851	234906	VAN	7,829
852	242903	WHEELER	7,821
853	169901	BOWIE	7,814
854	152907	FRENSHIP	7,799
855	212906	WHITEHOUSE	7,798
856	139911	NORTH LAMAR	7,786
857	174906	WODEN	7,783
858	021901	COLLEGE STATION	7,776
859	246909	ROUND ROCK	7,761
860	041902	ROBERT LEE	7,750
861	230902	GILMER	7,740
862	246906	HUTTO	7,721
863	025909	EARLY	7,684
864	178903	CALALLEN	7,678
865	167901	GOLDTHWAITE	7,677
866	161923	BOSQUEVILLE	7,670
867	227909	EANES	7,658
868	116902	CELESTE	7,646
869	212903	LINDALE	7,642
870	072903	STEPHENVILLE	7,628
871	143903	SHINER	7,609
872	101913	HUMBLE	7,604
873	057922	COPPELL	7,597
874	174911	DOUGLASS	7,593
875	035903	NAZARETH	7,570
876	092904	PINE TREE	7,565
877	227904	PFLUGERVILLE	7,559
878	163908	MEDINA VALLEY	7,548
879	101914	KATY	7,548
880	060902	COOPER	7,535
881	220916	HURST-EULESS-BEDFORD	7,529
882	123908	PORT NECHES	7,527

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
883	226906	WALL	7,526
884	043910	PLANO	7,513
885	109903	COVINGTON	7,430
886	220907	KELLER	7,427
887	209901	ALBANY	7,401
888	139912	PRAIRILAND	7,388
889	143902	MOULTON	7,381
890	049906	ERA	7,378
891	123905	NEDERLAND	7,355
892	084910	CLEAR CREEK	7,355
893	246904	GEORGETOWN	7,331
894	181908	LIT CYPRESS-MRCEVILLE	7,329
895	220920	WHITE SETTLEMENT	7,328
896	200901	BALLINGER	7,316
897	005901	ARCHER CITY	7,288
898	061902	LEWISVILLE	7,284
899	080901	MOUNT VERNON	7,247
900	243903	IOWA PARK CONS	7,232
901	043914	WYLIE	7,230
902	039905	MIDWAY	7,195
903	112909	SALTILLO	7,188
904	057911	HIGHLAND PARK	7,165
905	061906	PONDER	7,152
906	097903	HICO	7,099
907	061907	AUBREY	7,093
908	057909	GARLAND	7,072
909	123914	HAMSHIRE-FANNETT	7,062
910	184907	ALEDO	7,042
911	109914	PENELOPE	7,023
912	221912	WYLIE	7,021
913	220906	GRAPEVINE-COLLEYVILLE	6,987
914	161901	CRAWFORD	6,952
915	161919	BRUCEVILLE-EDDY	6,942
916	105904	DRIPPING SPRINGS	6,933
917	220919	CARRÖLL	6,927
918	018902	MERIDIAN	6,898
919	019906	REDWATER	6,888
920	061905	KRUM	6,880
921	092907	SPRING HILL	6,858
922	143901	HALLETTSVILLE	6,844
923	181901	BRIDGE CITY	6,752
924	112901	SULPHUR SPRINGS	6,733
925	067903	EASTLAND	6,637
926	130901	BOERNE	6,623
927	199901	ROCKWALL	6,623
928	105905	WIMBERLEY	6,592
929	161903	MIDWAY	6,589
930	075906	FAYETTEVILLE	6,584
931	084911	FRIENDSWOOD	6,571

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
932	141902	LOMETA	6,523
933	091909	WHITESBORO	6,432
934	109901	ABBOTT	6,430
935	161922	ROBINSON	6,404
936	019912	PLEASANT GROVE	6,401
937	191901	CANYON	6,378
938	018901	CLIFTON	6,371
939	161920	CHINA SPRING	6,313
940	005902	HOLLIDAY	6,255
941	246912	THRALL	6,122
942	049907	LINDSAY	5,768
943	252903	OLNEY	5,465
944	049902	MUENSTER	5,391
945	005903	MEGARGEL	.
946	009903	THREE WAY	.
947	011905	MCDADE	.
948	013902	PAWNEE	.
949	018903	MORGAN	.
950	018906	IREDELL	.
951	019910	MALTA	.
952	019911	RED LICK	.
953	019913	HUBBARD	.
954	019914	LEARY	.
955	020910	DAMON	.
956	022004	TERLINGUA CSD	.
957	022903	SAN VICENTE	.
958	025908	BROOKESMITH	.
959	028906	PRAIRIE LEA	.
960	031916	SOUTH TEXAS	.
961	034908	MARIETTA	.
962	040903	BLEDSoE	.
963	043908	MELISSA	.
964	043919	LOVEJOY	.
965	049908	WALNUT BEND	.
966	049909	SIVELLS BEND	.
967	057919	SUNNYVALE	.
968	059902	WALCOTT	.
969	061910	ARGYLE	.
970	062905	WESTHOFF	.
971	062906	MEYERSVILLE	.
972	066005	RAMIREZ CSD	.
973	072901	THREE WAY	.
974	072904	BLUFF DALE	.
975	072910	MORGAN MILL	.
976	073904	WESTPHALIA	.
977	079908	KENDLETON	.
978	081906	DEW	.
979	086024	DOSS CONS	.
980	089905	WAEELDER	.

.=LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED OR 0 PASSING

LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, WORKING PAPER
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT DATA USING TAAS SCORES BY CAMPUS FOR SPRING 93
GRUSENDORF REQUEST - RUN #4
(LBBS.GENERIC.GRUSNDORF(STDACH4A))

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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
981	090901	ALANREED	.
982	090905	GRANDVIEW-HOPKINS	.
983	091907	TIOGA	.
984	096908	LAKEVIEW	.
985	098903	PRINGLE-MORSE CONS	.
986	104907	PAINT CREEK	.
987	107908	MURCHISON	.
988	108915	MONTE ALTO	.
989	109908	MALONE	.
990	109910	MOUNT CALM	.
991	115002	ALLAMOORE CSD	.
992	115902	SIERRA BLANCA	.
993	117907	SPRING CREEK	.
994	122902	VALENTINE	.
995	125906	LA GLORIA	.
996	131001	KENEDY COUNTY WIDE CSD	.
997	133902	HUNT	.
998	133905	DIVIDE	.
999	137902	RICARDO	.
1000	137904	SANTA GERTRUDIS	.
1001	137905	LAURELES	.
1002	138901	GOREE	.
1003	138904	BENJAMIN	.
1004	143904	VYSEHRAD	.
1005	143905	SWEET HOME	.
1006	143906	EZZELL	.
1007	146903	DEVERS	.
1008	148905	DARROUZETT	.
1009	158904	MATAGORDA	.
1010	160905	LOHN	.
1011	161924	HALLSBURG	.
1012	161925	GHOLSON	.
1013	166902	GAUSE	.
1014	166907	BUCKHOLTS	.
1015	169906	GOLD BURG	.
1016	169908	MONTAGUE	.
1017	174910	ETOILE	.
1018	175911	RICE	.
1019	178905	DRISCOLL	.
1020	178906	LONDON	.
1021	180903	ADRIAN	.
1022	180904	WILDORADO	.
1023	182906	PALO PINTO	.
1024	184911	GARNER	.
1025	186901	BUENA VISTA	.
1026	187910	ONALASKA	.
1027	188904	BUSHLAND	.
1028	198902	CALVERT	.
1029	198906	MUMFORD	.

. = LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED OR 0 PASSING

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 GRUSENDORF REQUEST - RUN #4
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OBS	COUNTY DISTRICT NUMBER	DISTRICT NAME	DISTRICT INDICATOR
1030	200906	OLFEN	.
1031	201904	LEVERETTS CHAPEL	.
1032	206903	CHEROKEE	.
1033	209902	MORAN	.
1034	210906	EXCELSIOR	.
1035	211901	TEXHOMA	.
1036	223903	UNION	.
1037	225905	WINFIELD	.
1038	225906	CHAPEL HILL	.
1039	225907	HARTS BLUFF	.
1040	226907	GRAPE CREEK-PULLIAM	.
1041	226908	VERIBEST	.
1042	235903	MCFADDIN	.
1043	235904	NURSERY	.
1044	242905	KELTON	.
1045	243906	CITY VIEW	.
1046	244905	NORTHSIDE	.
1047	245901	LASARA	.
1048	246914	COUPLAND	.

.=LESS THAN 5 STUDENTS TESTED OR 0 PASSING